Dexter Boniface

Archive for the ‘United States Government’ Category

Central America’s Homicide Problem

In El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Human Rights, United States Government, Violence on June 6, 2012 at 6:52 pm

The Problem in Numbers

According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), there are roughly a dozen countries in the world where the homicide rate exceeds 35 per 100,000 people; four of them – Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – are in Central America. Honduras, with a staggering 82.1 homicides per 100,000 citizens, holds the sad distinction of having the highest homicide rate in the world today (for the data, see the UNODC’s Global Study on Homicide 2011).

As a point of comparison, the global average stands at 6.9 per 100,000 and the homicide rate in the United States clocks in at 5.0. In Europe and Asia, it is 3.5 or less. In Japan, it is a meager 0.5.

The aggregate figures are no less alarming. In 2010, 16,284 homicides took place in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras combined. Although less than thirty million people live in these three tiny countries, this is more homicides than occurred in the entire United States with a population of more than 313 million people! In short, Central America is experiencing a homicide epidemic.

Mexico’s War on Drugs

In Mexico, Military, United States Government, Violence on March 30, 2010 at 7:29 pm

This blogpost looks at the causes and consequences of Mexico’s Drug War. I underscore that America’s drug and gun habits (and laws) have an enormous cost in Mexico. I then provide an overview of Mexico’s cartels and their methods, and consider policy alternatives such as militarization and the legalization of drugs.

Mexico’s Drug War: A Problem “Made in the USA”

Mexico has become the main focal point in the regional war on drugs. There are many reasons for this, but the most obvious is the fact that Mexico occupies a strategic geographic position bordering the United States, the world’s largest and most lucrative drug market (one is reminded of Porfirio Diaz’s famous quote: “Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States!”).

American consumers of illegal drugs create massive demand. Marijuana, for example, commands an annual market worth an estimated $113 billion in the U.S. (our largest cash crop!) and is the most significant source of profit for the Mexican drug mafias (an estimated 60% of the cartels’ profits are derived from the marijuana market compared to 28% for cocaine and 1% for meth).

Mexico is the key supplier of illegal drugs to consumers in the United States. It is the largest foreign source of marijuana for the U.S. market, producing an estimated output of 35 million pounds in 2008! Furthermore, some 200 tons of crystal meth enters the U.S. from Mexico each year (after a U.S. law regulating over-the-counter sales of pseudoephedrine curbed domestic meth production, the Mexican cartels rushed to fill the void). And although cocaine originates in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, 90% of the coke entering the U.S. comes through Mexico.

Guns Without Borders (or How the NRA is Helping to Arm Mexico’s Drug Lords). The drugs flow north and huge profits from the illegal drug trade flow south (an estimated $25 to $40 billion in drug money flows to Mexico annually). And so do the guns. It’s estimated that 90% of the guns in the hands of the country’s drug mafias are purchased in the United States in the thousands of gun stores that line the border. How? Read this fascinating article and learn about four men who bought and smuggled 101 guns from 10 licensed dealers in Houston from June 2006 to June 2007. In addition to seeking help with arms interdiction, Mexican officials have appealed to the U.S. Congress to reinstate a ban on the sale of assault weapons that expired in 2004 but to no avail.

Cartel Geography

Much of the ongoing violence in the country can be understood in terms of rivalries over the country’s strategic drug entry and exit points (as well as the government’s concerted effort to shut them down). Cocaine arrives to Mexico in three strategic locations: over land via Guatemala (20%), by sea along the Gulf of Mexico (30%), and via the Pacific Ocean (50%) where it arrives to coastal states such as Guerrero (home to sunny Acapulco), Michoacan, and Sinaloa. (It’s no accident that the country’s largest drug mafias, the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels, are so named). Cocaine (along with plenty of Mexican-grown pot, meth, and some heroin) then exits the country across key Mexico-U.S. border cities in California, New Mexico and Texas including Tijuana/San Diego, Juarez/El Paso, and Nuevo Laredo/Laredo.

Mexico’s various drug mafias (Tijuana, Juarez, Gulf, Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Beltrán-Leyva, and La Familia) appear to be largely interchangeable, though a few have some distinguishing characteristics. Certainly their leaders all have good nicknames.

The Sinaloa cartel, led by Mexico’s most-wanted criminal, Joaquín El Chapo (“Shorty”) Guzmán, is described by the Economist as “smarter and more sophisticated” than its competition; it has largely eluded the Mexican government’s three-year crackdown (conspiracies abound).

The Beltrán-Leyva Group (once aligned to Sinaloa) survives in spite of the fact that its notorious leader, Arturo Beltrán Leyva (AKA “The Beard”), was killed in Cuernavaca during a shootout with Mexican Marines in late 2009.

La Familia: Dealing Drugs for Jesus

By far the strangest of Mexico’s drug mafias is the Narco-EvangelistMasters of Meth” known as “The Family.” Led by Nazario Moreno (AKA El Más Loco, or “The Craziest One”), La Familia hails from the Pacific coast state of Michoacán. While they are infamous for committing savage acts of violence (they once tossed five decapitated heads onto a dance floor in the city of Uruapan and are blamed for a grenade attack on innocent civilians in the state capital, Morelia), internally they adhere to a quasi-Christian code of ethics including abstention from drugs, support for the poor, and traditional family values.

In what the Wall Street Journal describes as a “vertically integrated” industry, La Familia’s presence extends deep into the United States where they control retail networks across the country. Recently, in a major counter-narcotics sweep, La Familia members were arrested in 38 U.S. cities including Atlanta and Chicago.

Sex, Drugs and Narcocorrido

Mexican cartels behave essentially like other international drug mafias, employing a mixture of brutality, corruption and a certain amount of business savvy. Much of the cartels’ violence is directed at one another (and, to a lesser extent, the Mexican military and police) as rival drug gangs compete for control of strategic trafficking arteries. Violence is also used to commit other crimes, especially extortion and kidnapping, both of which are targeted at Mexico’s business community (it’s estimated that the violence in Mexico saps 3% of the country’s GDP annually).

Corruption is also an integral aspect of the cartels’ operations. With the vast profits of the drug trade at their disposal, Mexico’s drug mafias are adept at buying off all likes of government officials. The story of Luis F. Alarid, an American Iraqi war veteran and U.S. customs inspector, is highly instructive. While most customs inspectors can expect to earn about $70,000 a year, Alarid pocketed $200,000 in a few months by waving in vehicles that should have raised suspicion. In Mexico, police officers and members of the justice system can often be bought for much less. Time Magazine describes how La Familia paid off a variety of public servants in Michoacán with payments of $20,000 a month, wild parties, and “truck loads of prostitutes.”

Of course, the cartels are also master smugglers. When outright bribery fails, traffickers have been able to evade border security by building sophisticated drug tunnels under the Mexico-U.S. border. They can also try sneaking it through in a van:

Fighting the Drug War: Five Alternatives

#1: Militarization (Status Quo). Mexico’s current (U.S.-backed) approach to the war on drugs can best be described as militarization. In light of the weaknesses of Mexico’s local and state police, President Felipe Calderon has relied heavily on the military in his war against drug smuggling–some 5o,000 troops have been dispatched to drug hot spots across Mexico. The premise of the militarization strategy is fairly straightforward: establish the rule of law by destroying the drug cartels. Although the Mexican military has had some successes with this approach (taking out Arturo Beltrán Leyva for one), critics question whether or not the drug war can really be won on the supply side alone as long as the demand for drugs remains high. As Andres Oppenheimer remarked, “Drug cartels don’t die; they just move.” Or in the words of one drug kingpin, Ismael Zambada, “As for the bosses, locked up, dead or extradited, their replacements are already standing by.” The militarization approach also entails fairly high costs in terms of lives lost and raw expenditure (as well as political risks for Mexico’s well respected military).

#2: Institutionalization (Status Quo Revised). The status quo may be shifting somewhat. Mexico and the United States recently unveiled a new security cooperation agreement that places greater emphasis on institution-building and community development. Still, some analysts are skeptical that Mexico’s U.S.-backed militarization strategy will change much.

#3: Strategic Truce (Status Quo Ante?). An alternative approach and what many regard as the status quo ante in Mexico (particularly under the PRI) would be to mitigate the violence of the drug trade by reaching a strategic truce with the cartels-essentially turning a blind eye to the drug trade in exchange for peace. Although such an approach appears tantamount to surrender, former Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda points out that, “This is less scandalous than it may appear. It would be similar to the approach the Obama administration is taking with poppy growers and heroin producers in Afghanistan.” Castaneda also made this point in a recent interview on CNN’s Amanpour.

#4: Decriminalization. Surprisingly, a number of Latin American countries (including Argentina, Colombia and Mexico) have recently decriminalized the possession  (though not the production and distribution) of small amounts of drugs. This is a fairly modest and common sense policy designed to keep the police chasing  hardened criminals rather than extorting petty drug users. However, it is difficult to see how decriminalization would alter the broader dynamics of Mexico’s Drug War in any significant way.

#5: Legalization. You don’t have to be a Harvard economist to understand the rationalization for drug legalization, though maybe it helps. In a lucid editorial for CNN, Jeffrey Miron, an economist and author of Drug War Crimes, explains how the violence and corruption associated with Mexico’s drug trade is a direct result of prohibition (specifically, drug prohibition in the United States). As he summarizes, “Violence results from policies that create black markets, not from the characteristics of the good or activity in question.” The case for the legalization of marijuana, arguably the least harmful illegal drug and the main source of revenue for the Mexican cartels (ironic considering how easy it is to produce), is perhaps the most compelling of all. Legalization could also, calculates professor Miron, save us $77 billion (and stop the redistribution of income to criminals):

To be sure, the United States is the critical actor in the legalization debate. Legalizing drugs in Mexico alone would not end the powerful incentives the violent drug cartels have to smuggle drugs into the United States, their primary market. Although U.S. policy-makers are loathe to contemplate drug legalization, even a modest policy shift like the legalization of medical marijuana (already a reality in fourteen states) could dramatically alter the marijuana marketplace and usefully undercut Mexico’s violent drug cartels. As a Washington Post article neatly summarizes, “competition from thousands of mom-and-pop marijuana farmers in the United States threatens the bottom line for powerful Mexican drug organizations in a way that decades of arrests and seizures have not.” Maybe President Obama, who pledged the federal government would not arrest medical marijuana users and suppliers who follow state laws, deserves that Peace Prize after all.

Does the OAS Have a Future?

In Inter-American Relations, Organization of American States, United States Government on March 9, 2010 at 3:17 pm

On February 23rd, 2010, Latin American leaders concluded a two-day Unity Summit in Playa del Carmen, Mexico and announced the creation of a new (yet-to-be-named) regional bloc that will include every country in Latin America and the Caribbean but exclude the United States and Canada. Could this new institution supplant the Organization of American States (OAS) and herald the demise of the U.S.-led inter-American system? Probably not, I argue below.

The View from Latin America

Latin Americans have long criticized the OAS for being a U.S.-dominated institution and sought mechanisms to counter-balance the influence of the United States in shaping the regional agenda. Over the last decade the search for such mechanisms has only intensified. There are a number of reasons for this new multilateralism in Latin America, including the declining influence (and attention) of the United States in the region; long-standing dissatisfaction with American policies; the  rise of extra-regional trade and investment partners such as the European Union, China and India; and the new spirit of independence among Latin American leaders, particularly those on the left.

Latin America’s vision for an “OAS without Empire” was well captured by Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa in an interview on CNN en Español (see below). While stressing that the goal of the new institution was not to replace the OAS, Correa  emphasized the need for Latin Americans to have their own institutions responding to their own interests. Even Mexico’s conservative President and staunch North American ally Felipe Calderón suggested the new bloc could counter (though not supplant) the OAS. For example, a Latin American forum excluding the United States and Canada would likely issue very different statements on contentious policy issues such as climate change, the Cuban embargo, the Falkland/Malvinas islands conflict, and the U.S.-led war(s) on drugs and terror. Still others, notably Mexico’s polemical former foreign minister Jorge Castañeda, expressed concern that the forum could have undesirable consequences if it alienates the United States from Latin America.

The View from Washington

Latin America’s seeming break from the OAS comes at a time when many in Washington are questioning the utility of the OAS as well.  A U.S. Senate report commissioned by Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was highly critical of the OAS and its Secretary General José Miguel Insulza. In a recent editorial, the Washington Post similarly lashed out at the OAS’s failure to consistently defend democracy in the region, sharply criticized Insulza, and urged Congress to “consider whether the United States should continue to provide the bulk of the funding for the OAS when it fails to live by its own charter.” Liz Harper, a contributing blogger for Americas Quarterly, faulted the OAS on similar grounds and suggested that it undergo a John Bolton-inspired downsizing of its bureaucracy. More sympathetic voices have suggested the need for institutional reforms, such as the creation of a UN-style Security Council or a Commission on Democracy, to make the OAS more effective at responding to regional crises. Striking a more optimistic tone, Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue has been one of the few to suggest that, “Obama would be wise to elevate the importance of the OAS.” Senators John Kerry and Robert Menendez recently introduced legislation to improve the embattled institution.

Conclusion: Does the OAS Have a Future?

Although enthusiasm for the OAS appears to be waning in both Latin America and Washington, the organization is unlikely to be supplanted anytime soon. The reason is three-fold.

First, in spite of recent criticism, the OAS retains distinctive normative and institutional strengths in important issue areas such as the promotion of democracy, election monitoring and human rights. Indeed, although many Latin American leaders have argued that the OAS should have taken a more aggressive approach in protesting the coup in Honduran last year and excluded Honduran President Porfirio Lobo from attending the summit, they showed no such qualms about welcoming the region’s least democratic leader, Cuban President Raúl Castro. The simple fact is that the regional democracy promotion agenda will be substantially weakened without the participation of the United States and Canada.

Second, Latin America’s push for a new “OAS without Empire” confronts obstacles of its own that are just as formidable, if not more so, as those confronting the OAS. For example, the internal divisions that have stymied the OAS were similarly on display in Playa del Carmen when Presidents Chávez and Uribe traded insults over bilateral relations. Moreover, as Andres Oppenheimer points out, Latin American leaders have a fairly limited vision for their new institution. It doesn’t even have a name yet, let alone stable financing or an institutional headquarters.

Third, and most importantly, the OAS can easily co-exist with (and benefit from) other multilateral institutions in the region. Indeed, the United States has thus far welcomed the creation of the new institution. If Latin American leaders can create a forum to solve their own problems, this is all the better for the United States and the agenda-heavy OAS. For instance, it was recently announced that Presidents Calderón, Lula and Leonel Fernández of the Dominican Republic would form a “group of friends” to mediate between Colombia and Venezuela. This initiative should be welcomed regardless of its institutional origin. The OAS could use a little competition.

Further Reading

DePalma, Anthony. “U.S. House of Representatives Goes “Animal House” on the OAS,” Americas Quaterly Blog 20 July 2011.

How Important is the Organization of American States?” interview with Harriet Babbitt, Roger Noriega, and John Maisto, Latin America Advisor, August 9, 2011.

Oppenheimer, Andres. “OAS is a basket case – but a needed one,” Miami Herald 25 July 2011.

Richardson, Bill. “U.S. should not retreat from the hemisphere,” Miami Herald 28 July 2011.

Rogin, Josh. “House panel votes to defund the OAS,” Foreign Policy: The Cable 20 July 2011.

The United States and Latin America: Collateral damage,” Economist 2 Aug. 2011.

Obama and Latin America: A Review of Year One

In Inter-American Relations, United States Government on January 17, 2010 at 1:00 am

January 20th marks the one year anniversary of Barack Obama’s inauguration. He took office amid high expectations of change. Here I examine Obama’s foreign policy as it pertains to Latin America.

Obama’s Challenge. Obama inherited a dual challenge in Latin America. First, to overcome the negative legacy of President Bush’s divisive War on Terror and rebuild trust in the hemisphere. Second, to come to grips with a rapidly changing global and hemispheric landscape marked by the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, and especially China (the so-called BRIC countries). The regional landscape has also been dramatically transformed by the rise of left-wing governments including anti-American populists such as Hugo Chavez. These forces, along with the devastating financial crisis in the United States, contributed to a growing spirit of independence on the part of Latin America. Proclaimed one sympathetic observer, “Latin America Breaks Free.” Could Obama re-unite the Americas?

Obama the Candidate. During the campaign, Obama outlined his proposal for “A New Partnership for the Americas” which aimed to depart from Bush-era policies in a number of ways. First, at the global level, he would withdraw U.S. military forces from Iraq, close the U.S. detention facility in Guatanamo and engage critics of the United States such as Cuba, Iran and Venezuela with constructive diplomacy. At the regional level, Obama promised to reduce travel and other restrictions to Cuba (though he backed away from lifting the embargo), rationalize immigration policy, increase aid to impoverished countries, battle both the supply and demand side in the war on drugs in Mexico and Colombia, and partner with Brazil to develop green energy. He would also oppose the Colombia Free Trade deal and seek to amend the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Obama’s proposals were received with both hope and skepticism by D.C.-based think tanks such as the Center for International Policy and the Council on Hemipsheric Affairs which saw the prospect of fairly modest changes.

Obama the President. In his first year in office Obama has indeed made modest advances in developing a “New Partnership” in the Americas. But much as the skeptics anticipated Obama has failed to fundamentally repair America’s strained relations with Latin America. To be sure, Obama has helped to improve the image of the United States around the world by placing a greater emphasis on multilateral cooperation and diplomacy. The Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago (where he received a handshake and some reading material from Chavez) was considered “a personal triumph” in terms of Obama’s public relations with Latin America (though the summit itself was largely a failure). And, as Andres Oppenheimer points out, Obama has followed through on a number of his pledges (most notably Cuba) even as Latin America remains (as it was under Bush) a low priority on his foriegn policy agenda.

The honeymoon did not last long. By year’s end, Obama was facing increased resistance from Latin American leaders who expressed  growing opposition to America’s military partnership with Colombia and disappointment with Obama’s handling of the democratic crisis in Honduras–both of which contributed to a minor rift between the U.S. and a critical ally Brazil. Many were also disappointed that Obama did not go further in reducing travel restrictions to Cuba. Time Magazine’s Tim Padgett reflected the attitude of many Latin Americans when he declared in a year-end summary that, “Obama’s Latin American Policy Looks Like Bush’s.”

My take: While disappointing in many respects, Obama’s Latin America Policy reflects the fundamental constraints the president faces in establishing a new partnership in the Americas. On the one hand, Obama’s domestic agenda–economic recovery, healthcare reform–has taken clear precedence in his first year in office while his foreign policy agenda has been dominated by two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. policy toward Latin America furthermore continues to be hampered by powerful domestic interest groups (the Cubans, of course, but also big agriculture) and needlessly obstructive checks and balances (Senator DeMint, I’m looking at you). On the other hand, Obama is largely powerless to combat the growing independence of Latin America which has been fueled by (among other things) impressive economic growth in Brazil, the increased  economic presence of China and Europe in the region, and the enduring appeal of anti-American populism.

That said, there is still room for maneuver–and substantial room for improvement–as Obama moves into his second year. On a positive note, the president begins his second year in office with his foreign policy team fully in place–after months of partisan delay, Arturo Valenzuela was finally confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs in November. Obama’s proposal for a “New Partnership” still serves as a useful guide–immigration reform and improving bilateral relationships with key allies such as Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil should be top priorities in 2010. And, needless to say, the United States should do everything within its means to assist the earthquake-ravaged country of Haiti.

Further Reading

Jorge Castañeda, “Adios, Monroe Doctrine,”  The New Republic, December 28, 2009. See also the  rejoinder by Michael Shifter.

Grandin, Greg, “Muscling Latin America,” The Nation, January 21, 2010.

Peter Hakim, “The Obama Administration: A Difficult Year in Latin America,” El Universal (Mexico), January 7, 2010. A video interview with Peter Hakim is also available here.

Collin Laverty, “Why Latin America is Disappointed with Barack Obama,” Huffington Post, January 7, 2010.

Jim Lobe, “Inertia on US-Latin America Relations,” Havana Times, January 6, 2010.

Christopher Sabatini, “Obama’s Latin American Policy: Talking Like It’s 1999,” Huffington Post, April 7, 2010.

Christopher Sabatini and Jason Marczak, “Obama’s Tango:  Restoring U.S. Leadership in Latin America,” Foreign Affairs: Snapshots, January/February 2010. A video interview with Christopher Sabatini and Shannon O’Neil is also available here.

Michael Shifter, “Obama and Latin America: Year One,” El Colombiano, December 26, 2009.

Julia E. Sweig, “Obama’s Disappointing Year in Latin America,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 12, 2010.

Elections in Honduras (2009)

In Democratic Crisis, Elections, Honduras, Inter-American Relations, United States Government on November 26, 2009 at 6:59 pm

Who will succeed Manuel Zelaya/Roberto Micheletti and will their election to power be viewed as legitimate? The controversial Honduran election pits Zelaya’s would-be successor and Liberal Party rival, Elvin Santos, against Zelaya’s 2005 challenger Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo of the conservative National Party.

Lobo carried the day–in part because of his promise to return Honduras to normalcy. His rival, Elvin Santos, once led the polls but was weakened by a rift in the Liberal Party provoked by Zelaya’s ouster. Lobo promised to launch a national dialogue to ameliorate political polarization in the country and called for an amnesty for all those involved in the coup (both Zelaya and the military leadership faced charges for abuse of power). Lobo furthermore indicated he was willing to meet with Zelaya.

The Election Controversy: Can Honduras Vote Itself Out of a Coup?

The controversy surrounding Honduras’ elections stems from the illegal ouster of incumbent President Manuel Zelaya some five months ago (see my blogpost: Coup in Honduras). After months of failed negotiations Zelaya remains out of power, holed up in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. Many countries have vowed not to recognize the outcome of the country’s elections in protest of the president’s ouster. Zelaya’s supporters in Honduras promised to boycott the election. The leading candidates for their part backed a negotiated solution to the crisis but appeared to be opposed to Zelaya being reinstated before the election. They urged the international community not to punish the next government.

A strong case can be made for not recognizing Honduras’ elections. As Christopher Sabatini and Daniel Altschuler recently argued, “acceptance of the elections results would [reveal] a troubling willingness to allow elected leaders to be removed as long as reasonably fair elections follow” and “would [signal] to would-be coup plotters in the region that election years offer opportune moments to overthrow democratically-elected presidents.” Brazilian President Lula concurred, stating “We can’t pretend nothing happened…If this state of affairs is allowed to remain, democracy will be at serious risk in Latin and Central America.” (See also  the critical commentaries by Laura Carlsen, Dana Frank, Sarah Stephens, Calvin Tucker, and Mark Weisbrot, among others). Still others see the elections as a viable solution to the months-old crisis including Honduras’ de facto leader Roberto Micheletti. (See also  the supportive commentaries by former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Eric Farnsworth, Mary O’Grady, and Edward Schumacher-Matos).

My take: The claims by Christopher Sabatini, Daniel Altschuler and President Lula are probably overstated. While there are principled grounds for not recognizing the election, it is less obvious that doing so will place democracy in the region at serious risk. Although one could claim that the de facto government in effect “got away” with a coup, the reality is that Honduras has paid a heavy price for the illegal ouster of Zelaya. The strong and largely unified reaction of the international community will surely deter all but the most radical coup plotters from kidnapping their president and shipping them out of the country any time in the future. The uncomfortable reality is that the coup conspirators in Honduras–distressed by Zelaya’s actions and weary of his alliance with Hugo Chavez–calculated that it was worth the risk of becoming an international pariah to remove Zelaya. On the other hand, Sabatini and Altschuler are correct to warn of the type of negative precedent that is being set.

The election itself appears to have exhibited a turnout rate more or less consistent with past elections (though the exact numbers remain disputed and arguably under-scrutinized). Furthermore, the election appeared to be free and fair–at least as reported by mainstream media (there were, however, a few reports of voter intimidation in rural areas–mostly at the hands of Zelaya’s supporters). An irregular patchwork of not-so-impartial election observers were on hand to observe the election after the OAS and Carter Center, among other organizations, chose not to send observers.

The Ambiguous Stance of the United States

The United States has taken an ambiguous position which has placed it at odds with much of Latin America. In September, the United States threatened not to recognize the outcome of Honduras’ presidential elections unless a political settlement was first reached. Then, in late October, the United States helped to broker a power-sharing deal to end the crisis. Although Zelaya soon declared the accord “totally dead“, the United States startled many when it indicated that it would be willing to recognize the results of the upcoming election–with or without Zelaya–as long as the key elements of the accord itself were upheld and the elections were deemed to meet international standards. In recent statements, the U.S. indicated the elections were satisfactory but encouraged further steps be taken toward reconciliation (e.g., the accord calls for the establishment of a truth commission on Zelaya’s ouster)–see the comments by Asst. Sec. of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs Arturo Valenzuela here. Zelaya, for his part, maintained that his quick restoration to power was a key element of the accord and lambasted the United States for its ambiguous posture. He indicated he would not accept the outcome of the elections nor return to the presidency after the election.

Congress Votes Against Zelaya’s Return – Zelaya in Limbo

As part of the U.S.-backed accord, the Honduran Congress, after a long delay, convened on Dec. 2nd and voted 111-14 not to reinstate the ousted president–in spite of substantial international pressure to do so. The vote followed a damaging ruling by the Supreme Court that said Zelaya cannot be legally returned to the presidency. The United States and European Union expressed disappointment with the Congressional vote.

The road ahead for Zelaya remains unknown. The Mexican Foreign Ministry indicated it would receive Zelaya but negotiations in Honduras broke down over the terms of his exile. After Zelaya refused to sign a letter dropping his demand to be reinstated, the de facto government withdrew its offer to grant the deposed president safe passage to Mexico, demanding that he leave Honduras only as a private citizen (i.e., not as president). In a laughable follow up, Micheletti subsequently explained that Zelaya would only be allowed exile oustide of Central America because he might “attack” Honduras from a neighboring country. Zelaya declared he will leave the Brazilian Embassy by January 27th–the end of his presidential term.

Will Latin America Recognize Lobo’s Election?

Regional heavywieghts Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela along with most others in the region (with the exceptions of Panama, Costa Rica, Colombia, Peru and Canada) have vowed not to recognize the election results. Indeed, one analyst predicted that, “The winner of the elections will remain an international pariah.” Still, in a recent New York Times article, analyst Shelley McConnell noted that the “pragmatic middle ground” may be to work with the O.A.S. to recognize the elections “under protest of how they came about.” It remains to be seen whether the rest of Latin America will follow the United States’ lead, whether a new compromise will be reached in Honduras or whether a deeper rift will develop. In a recent meeting, Brazil and the United States found common ground, requesting that Micheletti step down and Zelaya be granted free passage out of the country–though U.S.-Brazilian relations arguably remain desafinado (out of tune).

Postscript: Did the United States and the International Community Fail Honduras?

In a recent opinion piece, Andres Oppenheimer excoriated Brazil, the U.S., and the OAS for their mishandling of the Honduran crisis. Brazil, he noted, exhibited blatant hypocrisy by defending democracy in Honduras while extending recognition and legitimacy to the autocratic leaders of Cuba and Iran. The United States, for its part, flip-flopped  so much between condemnation and accommodation of the de facto government that the result was utter confusion (the New York Times  and the Council on Hemispheric Affairs similarly criticized the United States for “a disturbing lack of diplomatic skill” if not sheer “ineptitude“). Finally, the OAS was so one-sided in its support of Zelaya that it lost credibility as an honest broker in the crisis. In short, Brazil, the U.S., and the OAS “flunked the Honduras test.”

Constitutional Coup in Nicaragua

In Democratic Crisis, Inter-American Relations, Nicaragua, Organization of American States, United States Government on October 27, 2009 at 10:02 pm

On Monday, October 19th, 2009, the constitutional commission of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court overturned the constitutional article (No. 147) that prohibits presidents (and mayors) from seeking re-election and serving more than two terms. The decision paves the way for left-leaning President Daniel Ortega to seek re-election in 2011. However, critics allege that the decision was not legal and is thus tantamount to a “constitutional coup”.  The ruling is just one of several worrisome developments that  (further) call into question Nicaragua’s democratic credentials.

 

Ortega, a leader and former president (1984-1990) during the Sandinista Revolution (1979-1990) was re-elected to the presidency in 2006. His re-election was preceded by years of corrupt and Machiavellian deal-making between Nicaragua’s two largest political parties, the Liberals and Ortega’s Sandinistas (including a deal that enabled Ortega to win the presidency in the first round of voting with less than 40% of the vote). Since taking power, moreover, Ortega has been heavily criticized for his authoritarian tendencies. Municipal elections on November 9, 2008 (a major victory for the Sandinistas) were accompanied by widespread accusations of fraud–leading the United States and European countries  to suspend aid to the impoverished country. Furthermore Sandinista supporters have routinely attacked peaceful anti-government demonstrations in the country.

A Constitutional Coup?

Ortega’s critics have questioned the legality of the Supreme Court’s recent decision–and rightfully so. According to Nicaraguan law, the Constitution can only be amended by the legislature. Lacking the legislative support needed to amend the constitution, Ortega turned instead to the country’s heavily politicized courts.

The Supreme Court was evenly divided between Sandinista and Liberal appointees but the death of a Liberal Party justice tipped the balance in favor of the Sandinistas. In fact, only Sandinista appointees were present during the controversial constitutional vote and the president of the Supreme Court (a Liberal Party appointee), refused to recognize the decision. However, Liberal Party judges lack the votes to overturn the decision.

The Court’s decision has generated international criticism (including strong rebuke from the United States) and driven Nicaraguan opposition groups to mount daring and often humorous underground protests–in one, toilets were placed on the sidewalk of the Supreme Electoral Council with copies of the Constitution as toilet paper. For their part, pro-Sandinista mobs threatened the U.S. Ambassador Robert Callahan and vandalized the U.S. Embassy.

Adding to the controversy, in 2010, Ortega issued a pair of controversial decrees extending the terms of 25 magistrates and judges, including two Sandinista loyalists on the Supreme Court. When the President of the Supreme Court, Manuel Martíne, ordered the justices to surrender their gavels, armed Sandinista supporters stormed the court building and cheered the defiant judges as they reclaimed their seats on the bench. When Congressional opposition members subsequently met to discuss repealing the controversial decree, they too were attacked, leaving three lawmakers injured:

The OAS Should Act Now

My take: the recent breakdown of democracy in Nicaragua demands a response from the Organization of American States (OAS). Indeed, during the Honduran crisis (see blogpost), the OAS was accused of applying a double standard by defending besieged left-wing presidents but ignoring the threats to democracy posed by power-hungry (left-wing) populists. Taking a strong stand against Ortega’s blatant power-grab would demonstrate that the organization applies a consistent standard in its defense of democracy. Article 20 of the organization’s Democratic Charter stipulates that, “In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, any member state or the Secretary General may request the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council to undertake a collective assessment of the situation and to take such decisions as it deems appropriate.” The OAS should act now.

Further Reading

Carter Center, “Friends of The Inter-American Democratic Charter Issue Statement on Crisis in Nicaragua,” April 22, 2010.

Corrales, Javier, “Nicaragua: Déjà Coup All Over Again?Huffington Post, November 3, 2009.

Diehl, Jackson, “Leftist thugocracy in Nicaragua: Will Washington notice?Washington Post, April 21, 2010.

Economist, “Daniel Ortega’s Nicaragua: The show goes on (More blows against democracy),” April 29th 2010.

______, “How to steal an election,” Nov. 13th, 2008.

“For contras, a reprise of bitter discontent,” Miami Herald, November 20, 2009. Ex-contras re-organize?

Freedom House, “Country Report: Nicaragua,” Freedom in the World, 2010.

______, “Country Report: Nicaragua,” Freedom in the World, 2009.

Johnson, Tim, “Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega lays groundwork to stay in power,” Miami Herald, August 17, 2010.

Miami Herald, “Another president for life?” August 17, 2010.

Oppenheimer, Andres, “Nicaragua headed for one-man rule–again,” Miami Herald, March 17, 2011.

Rogers, Tim, Sandinistas demand removal of OAS ambassador to Nicaragua,” Daily News (Costa Rica), Sept. 14, 2010.

______, “Could Honduras crisis prompt a power grab in Nicaragua?” Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 2010.

______, “Ortega targeting his ex-comrades,” Miami Herald, Oct. 6th, 2008.

Sabatini, Christopher, “Here We Go Again: Nicaragua-Honduras-Re-Election,” Americas Quarterly, November 6, 2009.

News from Nicaragua:
1 Year After Municipal Elections:

Nicaragua’s Democracy Still Unraveling

By Tim Rogers
Nica Times Staff | trogers@ticotimes.net

Coup in Honduras

In Democratic Crisis, Honduras, Human Rights, Inter-American Relations, Military, United States Government on July 9, 2009 at 11:24 pm

This blog post is dedicated to the 2009 coup in Honduras. It covers the origins of the crisis, issues of constitutionality, the reaction and mediation of the international community, and what the crisis says about the state of democracy in Latin America.

What happened on June 28, 2009?

Around 5 a.m. on June 28 Honduras’ elected President Manuel Zelaya was roused from his bed by the military and (apparently while still wearing his pajamas) put on a plane to Costa Rica. Speaking from San Jose the same day Zelaya declared that he had been kidnapped in an illegal coup. In the meantime the Honduran Congress—citing a dubious resignation letter—voted to accept Zelaya’s ‘resignation’ and replace him with the next person in the line of presidential succession, the president of Congress Roberto Micheletti (the Honduran vice-president had earlier vacated his office in order to contest the presidential elections scheduled for later this year).

The Origins of the Crisis in Honduras

The crisis was largely the result of President Zelaya’s own political machinations. Zelaya had proposed to hold a non-binding referendum on Sunday June 28 on whether or not Hondurans supported the idea of redrawing the constitution, a maneuver widely interpreted as a Chavez-inspired bid by Zelaya to do away with the constitution’s unambiguous ban on presidential re-election. The Supreme Court (and, in turn, the attorney general and Congress) had declared the referendum to be illegal since certain clauses of the constitution are considered inviolable and because ultimate authority for revising the constitution rests with Congress. In spite of strenuous opposition Zelaya stubbornly insisted on holding the poll and sought the military’s cooperation in distributing the ballots. When General Romeo Vásquez, head of the armed forces, refused to cooperate he was sacked by the President (only to be questionably ‘reinstated’ by an immediate ruling of the Supreme Court). The following day (Friday, June 26), the defiant president and his supporters seized the ballots from a local air force base and vowed to continue with the referendum. The Court and attorney general then instructed General Vásquez to capture Zelaya and recover the ballots.

Issues of Constitutionality or When is a Coup a Coup?

In this crisis both sides have acted irresponsibly. Zelaya committed the first sin by failing to respect the rulings of the Supreme Court. He also placed his own political ambitions above a constitution that has done well to preserve stability in a fragile democracy. However even if Zelaya’s actions merited his removal from office they did not justify a military action replete with arbitrary detentions, fake documents, a media crackdown, and new restrictions on rights of assembly. If Zelaya is guilty of treason (as the Court alleges) then he should be tried and removed from office legally not overthrown by force.  In the words of Eduardo Enrique Reina, Zelaya’s minister of communication, “The legal mechanism they used to get rid of Zelaya was a machine gun.”

Still, the coup architects maintain that they did act constitutionally, a view that has been echoed in the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal and by Republican lawmakers (including Florida Representatives Connie Mack, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and former Senator Mel Martinez) — not to mention Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, and Charles Krauthammer. A report by the Law Library of Congress furthermore found that critical aspects of Zelaya’s removal were by all appearances constitutional, however the report has generated considerable controversy. Moreover, even the top Honduran military lawyer, Col. Herberth Bayardo Inestroza, acknowledges that they broke the law, as does Deputy Attorney General Roy David Urtecho. Furthermore, Article 71 of the Honduran Constitution specifies that, “No person may be detained or imprisoned for more than twenty-four hours without appearing before a competent authority for trial.”

Imagine, if you will, that an American president is found to be overstepping constitutional boundaries by, say, conducting warrantless surveillance of US citizens. The justice system declares his actions illegal. But the president, citing national security concerns, defies their rulings. Days later, American special forces storm the White House, seize the unpopular president and fly him to Panama. What would you call that? Many American presidents have acted unconstitutionally. However, none have suffered the humiliation of being kidnapped at gunpoint.

My take: By acting with haste and recklessness Zelaya’s detractors ceded the moral high ground before exhausting all of the means at their disposal including international mediation. In so doing they repeated the mistakes of those who acted unlawfully to overthrow Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in April 2002—only to see Chávez returned to power two days later stronger and more defiant than ever.

The Reaction of the International Community

The coup in Honduras was widely condemned by the international community including the United Nations (where Zelaya spoke on June 30th), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the European Union (which suspended some $92 million in aid), and the United States (which suspended aid, revoked the visas of four Honduran officials and halted military cooperation with Honduras). President Obama stated bluntly that, “the coup was not legal and that President Zelaya remains the president of Honduras.” From Moscow, he later declared that, “America supports now the restoration of the democratically elected president of Honduras, even though he has strongly opposed American policies…because we respect the universal principle that people should choose their own leaders, whether they are leaders we agree with or not.”

The Organization of American States. In 1991 the countries of the hemisphere formed a compact to defend and promote democracy that was later formalized in the Inter-American Democratic Charter or IADC of 2001. The OAS’s Democratic Charter has provided a foundation for reacting to the ongoing political developments in Honduras. Responding to a request for mediation from the Honduran government two days prior to the coup, the OAS Permanent Council first issued a resolution on the situation in Honduras [see CP/RES. 952 (1699/09) of June 26, 2009] citing Article 17 of the IADC. On the day of the coup, the Permanent Council met (see video here) and issued a strongly worded resolution [see CP/RES. 953 (1700/09)] and called for a special session of the OAS General Assembly to take place at the headquarters of the Organization beginning Tuesday, June 30, 2009. The Foreign Ministers then issued a 3-day ultimatum to the government [see AG/RES. 1 (XXXVII-E/09) of July 1] to restore Zelaya or face suspension. The OAS Secretary General, Jose Miguel Insulza, subsequently traveled to Honduras to try to broker a negotiated settlement. However, when the Honduran government refused to comply, the OAS issued a second resolution [see AG/RES. 2 (XXXVII-E/09) of July 4] unanimously suspending the government consistent with Articles 20 and 21 of the Democratic Charter.

The OAS has, in turn, become a political target. Conservative commentators such as Glenn Garvin, Mary Anastasia O’Grady and Alvaro Vargas Llosa maintain that the OAS applies a double standard in its defense of democracy, rushing to the defense of besieged left-wing presidents while ignoring the threats to democracy posed by illiberal populists  (viz., Chavez, Morales, Correa, Ortega, and Zelaya) when they are in power.  In an interview with Andres Oppenheimer, Antonio Ledezma — the effectively deposed opposition mayor of Caracas, Venezuela — complained that the OAS is degenerating into “a mutual protection club for power-hungry presidents.” The OAS Secretary General, José Miguel Insulza, responded to these objections noting that “the OAS answers to its member states” and that Honduras’ expulsion adheres to the principles, practices and purposes of the organization.

Obama and the Partisan Split in the United States

As the crisis dragged on, a clear partisan split emerged in the United States with several Republican members of Congress strongly opposing Zelaya’s reinstatement. Senator Jim DeMint (R-S.C.), in a rather irresponsible move, promised to hold up several confirmation hearings in protest of the Obama administration’s handling of the crisis (only in November did DeMint finally relent). On the other side of the aisle, several Democrats and NGOs urged Congress and the Obama administration to more aggressively condemn the coup and enact tougher sanctions, though President Obama maintained that he “can’t push a button and suddenly reinstate Mr. Zelaya.”

The U.S. State Department, in what some regarded as a softening of the U.S.’s initial position, responded to conservatives’ concerns in a letter addressed to Indiana Senator Richard Lugar, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The letter suggested that the United States was unlikely to impose sanctions on Honduras in the event that Zelaya is not reinstated–a position welcomed by conservatives but bitterly opposed by many on the left. Massachusetts Democrat John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed concern that the State Department letter “risks sending a confusing signal” about the United States’ position. Kerry laid the blame for the crisis on Micheletti’s “uncompromising power-grab” and later sparred with DeMint over the senator’s fact-finding mission in Honduras. The State Department for its part has equivocated on whether or not Zelaya’s removal officially meets the legal definition of a military coup d’etat.

My take: Promoting democracy abroad is an admirable goal that serves vital US interests. The United States and the international community should remain steadfast in their opposition to Zelaya’s illegal ouster and not extend recognition to the Micheletti government. If the de facto government remains defiant and ongoing mediation fails, the United States and other members of the Organization of American States (OAS) should consider additional sanctions against Honduras. By the same token, the OAS should prevail upon Zelaya to respect the checks and balances that come with democracy. In short, the international community should continue to push for a negotiated settlement. The alternative is economic and political isolation for Honduras.

Negotiations and Border Crossings (July-August)

A week after the coup, Zelaya vowed to return to Honduras in spite of warnings that he would immediately be arrested on multiple charges if he did so. However, on Sunday July 5th–a day after Honduras’ suspension from the OAS–military vehicles blocked the runways and prevented Zelaya’s plane from landing. In violent clashes near the airport, a teenager was killed. After stops in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Zelaya next traveled to Washington where he met with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. A new American-led initiative to have Costa Rican President Oscar Arias mediate the political crisis was announced. In spite of Arias’ efforts, however, joint negotiations (begun on July 9th in Costa Rica and postponed on July 23rd) produced few signs of compromise. Zelaya then tried to galvanize his supporters by staging a short-lived border crossing into Honduras from Nicaragua on July 24th, a move Hillary Clinton described as “reckless.”

The OAS subsequently organized a special envoy to pressure the interim government into accepting Arias’ compromise plan. After some delay the de facto government agreed to receive the OAS envoy, only to reverse their position before eventually letting the high-level delegation into the country. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also visited the country from August 17-21 to observe the human rights situation in the country; the commission’s preliminary report on Honduras’ human rights situation was highly critical.

Is there still room for compromise? (Part One) Perhaps. Zelaya’s term is nearly finished (it ends Jan. 27th) and he has agreed not to seek re-election under any circumstances. The United States, the OAS, and the Honduran military all back a negotiated settlement, and the Honduran Congress agreed to study the multi-point plan proposed by Arias.  The so-called San Jose Accord calls for the reinstatement of Zelaya, an amnesty for actors on both sides and early elections (elections were scheduled and ultimately held on Nov. 29th).

However, the Micheletti government remained firmly opposed to Zelaya’s reinstatement and the Supreme Court indicated that Zelaya would face trial if he returned to the country. In a counter-proposal, Micheletti offered to resign his post as long as Zelaya did the same. The OAS, however, contends that any negotiated settlement must restore Zelaya to the presidency. Zelaya, in turn, headed to the United States to press his case that the Obama administration should take a tougher stand against the coup. The United States subsequently announced that it was permanently suspending non-humanitarian aid to Honduras, including U.S. Millennium Challenge Account funds worth as much as $200 million.

Can Honduras Vote Itself Out of a Coup? The U.S. furthermore threatened not to recognize the outcome of Honduras’ presidential elections (see my blogpost: Honduras Votes) unless a political settlement is first reached–a position shared by Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and most other Latin American countries (with the notable exception of Panama)–but opposed by those that see the elections as a viable solution to the crisis (including, among others, Micheletti himself and former Secretary of State James A. Baker III). The de facto government announced that the elections would be held as scheduled. Yet others have expressed the opinion that, “If Micheletti thinks that Honduras will overcome its crisis by holding elections under the current circumstances, he’s dreaming. The winner of the elections will remain an international pariah, and Honduras will become increasingly poorer.”

Surprise! The Return of Zelaya (September)

Zelaya again made headlines on Monday, September 21st, when it was announced that the deposed president had secretly returned to Honduras. It was soon confirmed that Zelaya was being housed in the Brazilian embassy in the Honduran capital Tegucigalpa where he addressed his supporters and called for dialogue. The de facto government responded by issuing a curfew, forcefully removing protestors from the streets, cutting off utilities to the embassy, and demanding that Brazil surrender the deposed leader (the Honduran de facto government later took their case against Brazil to the World Court).

Enter Brazil. The Brazilian President Lula da Silva explained that letting Zelaya into its embassy was “what any democratic country would do, ” adding sharply that, “We can’t accept that for political differences people think they have the right to depose a democratically-elected president …  If you like or don’t like something you change it in an election. What you can not do is accept a coup leader who thinks he has the right to be president.” The Brazilian government furthermore warned that it would not tolerate any actions taken against its embassy and personnel (the OAS and UN Security Council later joined Brazil in its condemnation of actions taken against the embassy, which included reports of a toxic gas attack). Lula, speaking at the United Nations called for Zelaya’s reinstatement, noting that, “Unless there is political will, we will see more coups like the one that toppled the constitutional president of Honduras.” Analysts (and many Brazilians) are divided over Brazil‘s seemingly risky role in the crisis.

In the meantime, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Costa Rican President Oscar Arias urged calm while expressing hope that fresh negotiations could help end the crisis. At the same time, though, the U.S. ambassador to the OAS (and a hard-line foreign service officer) Lewis Anselem, criticized Zelaya for his “irresponsible and foolish” return from exile before a settlement was reached.

Is there still room for compromise? (Part Two) In a major development, Micheletti announced that he was willing to talk with Zelaya “as long as he explicitly recognises the presidential elections.” The de facto government then indicated that it would welcome a new OAS mission to the country (a move endorsed by the United States)–only to later expel the OAS representatives from the country and then re-invite them. On September 27th, in a divisive and ultimately counter-productive move, Micheletti issued a 45-day suspension of basic civil liberties (later revoked). The move exposed emerging divisions within Micheletti’s support base, with  some business and military leaders expressing a willingness to allow Zelaya’s return to power. The move also heightened accusations of abuse by Honduran security forces.

A Negotiated End to the Crisis? (October-November)

Negotiations in late September and October neared a major breakthrough when negotiators for both sides appeared to agree on every major point of the San Jose accord–except the return of Zelaya to the presidency.

The United States to the Rescue? As negotiations reached an impasse, the United States stepped up its pressure by sending a high-level envoy to Honduras made up of Tom Shannon (then U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs), Craig Kelly, and Dan Restrepo. At last a power-sharing dealdubbed the Guaymuras Accord (or Tegucigalpa/San Jose Accord)– was reached to form a national unity government, create a truth commission to investigate Zelaya’s ouster, and hold new presidential elections as scheduled. As part of the pact, the decision of whether or not to reinstate Zelaya was left to the Honduran Congress. Unlike the San Jose accord, the pact does not include an amnesty. However ambiguities in the accord left many to conclude that “the political waters are in many ways murkier than they have been since Zelaya was toppled on June 28.”

Although the accord did not explicitly guarantee his immediate return to power, Zelaya indicated that he would consider the deal broken if he wasn’t quickly reinstated. Yet with the election imminent the Honduran Congress appeared to be in no hurry to decide Zelaya’s fate (the decision was eventually slated for Dec. 2nd, a few days after the election). It announced it would first weigh the opinions of Honduras’ Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Human Rights ombudsman. Moreover, it remained unclear how the international community would react if the Honduran Congress decided not to reinstate Zelaya. In an interview with CNN en Español that startled many, Tom Shannon indicated that the United States would be willing to recognize the results of Honduras’ upcoming election–with or without Zelaya–as long as the accord was upheld. Yet this position put the United States at odds with most the region’s leaders (e.g., the OAS and Rio Group) and provoked a strong rebuke from Zelaya.

Totally Dead? After a week  of inaction by Congress, Zelaya declared the accord “totally dead.” Still the United States held out hope that negotiations could be revived and (re)dispatched Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Craig Kelly to Tegucigalpa–even as Zelaya’s supporters were calling for an election boycott. However, Kelly failed to make any progress during his two-day visit. Moreover, Zelaya subsequently indicated he would not accept the outcome of the country’s upcoming elections nor return to the presidency after they take place.

Who’s to blame for the breakdown? Lanny Davis, a well-connected attorney representing the Honduran Business Council, places the blame squarely on Zelaya. The left-leaning Council on Hemispheric Affairs and the Los Angeles Times, on the other hand, blamed Micheletti and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. No doubt both sides of the conflict share the blame for the breakdown.

Will the international community recognize the upcoming election if Zelaya is not reinstated? A strong case can be made for not recognizing Honduras’ upcoming elections. As Christopher Sabatini and Daniel Altschuler recently argued, “U.S. acceptance of the elections results would have revealed a troubling willingness to allow elected leaders to be removed as long as reasonably fair elections follow” and “would have signaled to would-be coup plotters in the region that election years offer opportune moments to overthrow democratically-elected presidents.” Still, in a recent New York Times article, analyst Shelley McConnell noted that if Mr. Zelaya is not returned, the “pragmatic middle ground” may be to work with the O.A.S. to recognize the elections “under protest of how they came about.” For more on the presidential election and Zelaya’s future, see my blogpost: Honduras Votes.

Broader Trends and Implications

The Honduran crisis is emblematic of Latin America’s wider problems with democracy, including weak political institutions, weak rule of law, hyper-presidentialism or caudillismo, the perils of illiberal populism and social-political polarization, politicized term limits, the influence of big business, and the ongoing power of Latin America’s militaries (see related blogpost). The coup has also  had regional reverberations most notably in Nicaragua.

It also shows the limits of the international community, and specifically the OAS, to take preventative action that would curb executive abuses of power that undermine democracy and often lead to political crises such as this (recent developments in Nicaragua provide another example–see blogpost). Indeed, the conflict in Honduran has exposed both the importance and the flaws of the  Inter-American Democratic Charter.

Similarly, the crisis has demonstrated the limitations of the OAS when it comes to taking action against a country which has openly defied its mandates. Throughout the crisis, pressure from the United States appears to have been more decisive than pressure from the OAS or other international actors–with the possible exception of Brazil.

Finally, it confirms that traditional military coups are becoming a thing of the past, but quasi-constitutional coups–in which the head of state is removed by force (or the threat of force) and is replaced by the constitutional successor to power–have emerged as a new and ongoing threat.  Others are calling it a ‘soft coup‘ or, my favorite so far, ‘impeachment on steroids‘. Read the rest of this entry »