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Archive for the ‘Democratic Crisis’ Category

Is the Democratic Crisis in Honduras Over?

In Democratic Crisis, Honduras on February 8, 2010 at 5:08 pm

The inauguration on January 27, 2010 of Honduras’ new president, Porfirio Lobo, and the simultaneous departure of Manuel Zelaya to the Dominican Republic raised expectations that the country’s long democratic crisis would finally come to an end. Is it over?

Bye Bye Zelaya

Lobo’s first act as president was to sign an amnesty decree issued by the Honduran Congress. The decree absolves Zelaya and the Honduran military for any abuses of power associated with the June 2009 crisis (though Zelaya was not absolved of other charges, including embezzlement). In a deal brokered by President Leonel Fernandez of the Dominican Republic and President Lobo, Zelaya was granted safe passage out of the Brazilian Embassy in Honduras (where he had been holed up for 129 days) to the Dominican Republic. Zelaya vowed to return to Honduras. Six high-ranking members of the Honduran military also faced charges of abuse of power; however, they were found not guilty by the Honduran Supreme Court.

Lone Wolf?

President Lobo’s inaugration was a relatively lonely affair. Many regional leaders continue to shun the Lobo government as a result of the country’s protracted democratic crisis stemming from Zelaya’s ouster on June 28, 2009. Still, such opposition appears to be weakening. The United States, for its part, has embraced the new president but insisted that additional steps need to be taken (e.g., the creation of a Truth Commission to investigate the June 2009 crisis) before Honduras can be returned to good standing in the Organization of American States and other regional institutions. Sanctions against Honduras have taken a heavy toll on the poverty-stricken country; upon taking office, Lobo found the country to be bankrupt. Lobo has moved quickly to establish the Truth Commission; it was announced that the effort will be spearheaded by Guatemalan statesman Eduardo Stein and that the report will be released in four months (after some delay, it is scheduled to be released in May 2011). For his part, Zelaya was not impressed.

My take: It’s time for the international community and the Honduran people to move on and for Honduras to be readmitted into the inter-American community. The recent decision by El Salvador’s left-wing government to recognize Lobo’s conservative government (and hints from others that they will likely do the same), as well as the recent announcement that the World Bank will restore development aid to Honduras, bode well for an end to the political crisis. With the amnesty firmly in place, the Truth Commission will be well positioned to set the record straight as regards the events of June 2009 (though there is skepticism that the inquiry will succeed).

 

Further reading

Eldridge, Joseph and Vicki Gass, “Restoring International Relations With Honduras: A Way Forward,” Huffington Post, January 26, 2010.

Recent developments

Committee to Protect Journalists, “CPJ alarmed by wave of anti-press attacks in Honduras,” April 6th, 2011.

Economist, “Honduras and its former president: Why a pariah may return,” March 10th, 2011. Might Zelaya soon return to Honduras?

Frank, Dana, “US: Wrong on Honduras,” The Nation, Jan. 31, 2011.

Stevenson, Mark, “Year later, new coup talks,” Miami Herald, June 28, 2010.

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Elections in Honduras (2009)

In Democratic Crisis, Elections, Honduras, Inter-American Relations, United States Government on November 26, 2009 at 6:59 pm

Who will succeed Manuel Zelaya/Roberto Micheletti and will their election to power be viewed as legitimate? The controversial Honduran election pits Zelaya’s would-be successor and Liberal Party rival, Elvin Santos, against Zelaya’s 2005 challenger Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo of the conservative National Party.

Lobo carried the day–in part because of his promise to return Honduras to normalcy. His rival, Elvin Santos, once led the polls but was weakened by a rift in the Liberal Party provoked by Zelaya’s ouster. Lobo promised to launch a national dialogue to ameliorate political polarization in the country and called for an amnesty for all those involved in the coup (both Zelaya and the military leadership faced charges for abuse of power). Lobo furthermore indicated he was willing to meet with Zelaya.

The Election Controversy: Can Honduras Vote Itself Out of a Coup?

The controversy surrounding Honduras’ elections stems from the illegal ouster of incumbent President Manuel Zelaya some five months ago (see my blogpost: Coup in Honduras). After months of failed negotiations Zelaya remains out of power, holed up in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. Many countries have vowed not to recognize the outcome of the country’s elections in protest of the president’s ouster. Zelaya’s supporters in Honduras promised to boycott the election. The leading candidates for their part backed a negotiated solution to the crisis but appeared to be opposed to Zelaya being reinstated before the election. They urged the international community not to punish the next government.

A strong case can be made for not recognizing Honduras’ elections. As Christopher Sabatini and Daniel Altschuler recently argued, “acceptance of the elections results would [reveal] a troubling willingness to allow elected leaders to be removed as long as reasonably fair elections follow” and “would [signal] to would-be coup plotters in the region that election years offer opportune moments to overthrow democratically-elected presidents.” Brazilian President Lula concurred, stating “We can’t pretend nothing happened…If this state of affairs is allowed to remain, democracy will be at serious risk in Latin and Central America.” (See also  the critical commentaries by Laura Carlsen, Dana Frank, Sarah Stephens, Calvin Tucker, and Mark Weisbrot, among others). Still others see the elections as a viable solution to the months-old crisis including Honduras’ de facto leader Roberto Micheletti. (See also  the supportive commentaries by former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Eric Farnsworth, Mary O’Grady, and Edward Schumacher-Matos).

My take: The claims by Christopher Sabatini, Daniel Altschuler and President Lula are probably overstated. While there are principled grounds for not recognizing the election, it is less obvious that doing so will place democracy in the region at serious risk. Although one could claim that the de facto government in effect “got away” with a coup, the reality is that Honduras has paid a heavy price for the illegal ouster of Zelaya. The strong and largely unified reaction of the international community will surely deter all but the most radical coup plotters from kidnapping their president and shipping them out of the country any time in the future. The uncomfortable reality is that the coup conspirators in Honduras–distressed by Zelaya’s actions and weary of his alliance with Hugo Chavez–calculated that it was worth the risk of becoming an international pariah to remove Zelaya. On the other hand, Sabatini and Altschuler are correct to warn of the type of negative precedent that is being set.

The election itself appears to have exhibited a turnout rate more or less consistent with past elections (though the exact numbers remain disputed and arguably under-scrutinized). Furthermore, the election appeared to be free and fair–at least as reported by mainstream media (there were, however, a few reports of voter intimidation in rural areas–mostly at the hands of Zelaya’s supporters). An irregular patchwork of not-so-impartial election observers were on hand to observe the election after the OAS and Carter Center, among other organizations, chose not to send observers.

The Ambiguous Stance of the United States

The United States has taken an ambiguous position which has placed it at odds with much of Latin America. In September, the United States threatened not to recognize the outcome of Honduras’ presidential elections unless a political settlement was first reached. Then, in late October, the United States helped to broker a power-sharing deal to end the crisis. Although Zelaya soon declared the accord “totally dead“, the United States startled many when it indicated that it would be willing to recognize the results of the upcoming election–with or without Zelaya–as long as the key elements of the accord itself were upheld and the elections were deemed to meet international standards. In recent statements, the U.S. indicated the elections were satisfactory but encouraged further steps be taken toward reconciliation (e.g., the accord calls for the establishment of a truth commission on Zelaya’s ouster)–see the comments by Asst. Sec. of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs Arturo Valenzuela here. Zelaya, for his part, maintained that his quick restoration to power was a key element of the accord and lambasted the United States for its ambiguous posture. He indicated he would not accept the outcome of the elections nor return to the presidency after the election.

Congress Votes Against Zelaya’s Return – Zelaya in Limbo

As part of the U.S.-backed accord, the Honduran Congress, after a long delay, convened on Dec. 2nd and voted 111-14 not to reinstate the ousted president–in spite of substantial international pressure to do so. The vote followed a damaging ruling by the Supreme Court that said Zelaya cannot be legally returned to the presidency. The United States and European Union expressed disappointment with the Congressional vote.

The road ahead for Zelaya remains unknown. The Mexican Foreign Ministry indicated it would receive Zelaya but negotiations in Honduras broke down over the terms of his exile. After Zelaya refused to sign a letter dropping his demand to be reinstated, the de facto government withdrew its offer to grant the deposed president safe passage to Mexico, demanding that he leave Honduras only as a private citizen (i.e., not as president). In a laughable follow up, Micheletti subsequently explained that Zelaya would only be allowed exile oustide of Central America because he might “attack” Honduras from a neighboring country. Zelaya declared he will leave the Brazilian Embassy by January 27th–the end of his presidential term.

Will Latin America Recognize Lobo’s Election?

Regional heavywieghts Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela along with most others in the region (with the exceptions of Panama, Costa Rica, Colombia, Peru and Canada) have vowed not to recognize the election results. Indeed, one analyst predicted that, “The winner of the elections will remain an international pariah.” Still, in a recent New York Times article, analyst Shelley McConnell noted that the “pragmatic middle ground” may be to work with the O.A.S. to recognize the elections “under protest of how they came about.” It remains to be seen whether the rest of Latin America will follow the United States’ lead, whether a new compromise will be reached in Honduras or whether a deeper rift will develop. In a recent meeting, Brazil and the United States found common ground, requesting that Micheletti step down and Zelaya be granted free passage out of the country–though U.S.-Brazilian relations arguably remain desafinado (out of tune).

Postscript: Did the United States and the International Community Fail Honduras?

In a recent opinion piece, Andres Oppenheimer excoriated Brazil, the U.S., and the OAS for their mishandling of the Honduran crisis. Brazil, he noted, exhibited blatant hypocrisy by defending democracy in Honduras while extending recognition and legitimacy to the autocratic leaders of Cuba and Iran. The United States, for its part, flip-flopped  so much between condemnation and accommodation of the de facto government that the result was utter confusion (the New York Times  and the Council on Hemispheric Affairs similarly criticized the United States for “a disturbing lack of diplomatic skill” if not sheer “ineptitude“). Finally, the OAS was so one-sided in its support of Zelaya that it lost credibility as an honest broker in the crisis. In short, Brazil, the U.S., and the OAS “flunked the Honduras test.”

Constitutional Coup in Nicaragua

In Democratic Crisis, Inter-American Relations, Nicaragua, Organization of American States, United States Government on October 27, 2009 at 10:02 pm

On Monday, October 19th, 2009, the constitutional commission of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court overturned the constitutional article (No. 147) that prohibits presidents (and mayors) from seeking re-election and serving more than two terms. The decision paves the way for left-leaning President Daniel Ortega to seek re-election in 2011. However, critics allege that the decision was not legal and is thus tantamount to a “constitutional coup”.  The ruling is just one of several worrisome developments that  (further) call into question Nicaragua’s democratic credentials.

 

Ortega, a leader and former president (1984-1990) during the Sandinista Revolution (1979-1990) was re-elected to the presidency in 2006. His re-election was preceded by years of corrupt and Machiavellian deal-making between Nicaragua’s two largest political parties, the Liberals and Ortega’s Sandinistas (including a deal that enabled Ortega to win the presidency in the first round of voting with less than 40% of the vote). Since taking power, moreover, Ortega has been heavily criticized for his authoritarian tendencies. Municipal elections on November 9, 2008 (a major victory for the Sandinistas) were accompanied by widespread accusations of fraud–leading the United States and European countries  to suspend aid to the impoverished country. Furthermore Sandinista supporters have routinely attacked peaceful anti-government demonstrations in the country.

A Constitutional Coup?

Ortega’s critics have questioned the legality of the Supreme Court’s recent decision–and rightfully so. According to Nicaraguan law, the Constitution can only be amended by the legislature. Lacking the legislative support needed to amend the constitution, Ortega turned instead to the country’s heavily politicized courts.

The Supreme Court was evenly divided between Sandinista and Liberal appointees but the death of a Liberal Party justice tipped the balance in favor of the Sandinistas. In fact, only Sandinista appointees were present during the controversial constitutional vote and the president of the Supreme Court (a Liberal Party appointee), refused to recognize the decision. However, Liberal Party judges lack the votes to overturn the decision.

The Court’s decision has generated international criticism (including strong rebuke from the United States) and driven Nicaraguan opposition groups to mount daring and often humorous underground protests–in one, toilets were placed on the sidewalk of the Supreme Electoral Council with copies of the Constitution as toilet paper. For their part, pro-Sandinista mobs threatened the U.S. Ambassador Robert Callahan and vandalized the U.S. Embassy.

Adding to the controversy, in 2010, Ortega issued a pair of controversial decrees extending the terms of 25 magistrates and judges, including two Sandinista loyalists on the Supreme Court. When the President of the Supreme Court, Manuel Martíne, ordered the justices to surrender their gavels, armed Sandinista supporters stormed the court building and cheered the defiant judges as they reclaimed their seats on the bench. When Congressional opposition members subsequently met to discuss repealing the controversial decree, they too were attacked, leaving three lawmakers injured:

The OAS Should Act Now

My take: the recent breakdown of democracy in Nicaragua demands a response from the Organization of American States (OAS). Indeed, during the Honduran crisis (see blogpost), the OAS was accused of applying a double standard by defending besieged left-wing presidents but ignoring the threats to democracy posed by power-hungry (left-wing) populists. Taking a strong stand against Ortega’s blatant power-grab would demonstrate that the organization applies a consistent standard in its defense of democracy. Article 20 of the organization’s Democratic Charter stipulates that, “In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, any member state or the Secretary General may request the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council to undertake a collective assessment of the situation and to take such decisions as it deems appropriate.” The OAS should act now.

Further Reading

Carter Center, “Friends of The Inter-American Democratic Charter Issue Statement on Crisis in Nicaragua,” April 22, 2010.

Corrales, Javier, “Nicaragua: Déjà Coup All Over Again?Huffington Post, November 3, 2009.

Diehl, Jackson, “Leftist thugocracy in Nicaragua: Will Washington notice?Washington Post, April 21, 2010.

Economist, “Daniel Ortega’s Nicaragua: The show goes on (More blows against democracy),” April 29th 2010.

______, “How to steal an election,” Nov. 13th, 2008.

“For contras, a reprise of bitter discontent,” Miami Herald, November 20, 2009. Ex-contras re-organize?

Freedom House, “Country Report: Nicaragua,” Freedom in the World, 2010.

______, “Country Report: Nicaragua,” Freedom in the World, 2009.

Johnson, Tim, “Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega lays groundwork to stay in power,” Miami Herald, August 17, 2010.

Miami Herald, “Another president for life?” August 17, 2010.

Oppenheimer, Andres, “Nicaragua headed for one-man rule–again,” Miami Herald, March 17, 2011.

Rogers, Tim, Sandinistas demand removal of OAS ambassador to Nicaragua,” Daily News (Costa Rica), Sept. 14, 2010.

______, “Could Honduras crisis prompt a power grab in Nicaragua?” Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 2010.

______, “Ortega targeting his ex-comrades,” Miami Herald, Oct. 6th, 2008.

Sabatini, Christopher, “Here We Go Again: Nicaragua-Honduras-Re-Election,” Americas Quarterly, November 6, 2009.

News from Nicaragua:
1 Year After Municipal Elections:

Nicaragua’s Democracy Still Unraveling

By Tim Rogers
Nica Times Staff | trogers@ticotimes.net

Coup in Honduras

In Democratic Crisis, Honduras, Human Rights, Inter-American Relations, Military, United States Government on July 9, 2009 at 11:24 pm

This blog post is dedicated to the 2009 coup in Honduras. It covers the origins of the crisis, issues of constitutionality, the reaction and mediation of the international community, and what the crisis says about the state of democracy in Latin America.

What happened on June 28, 2009?

Around 5 a.m. on June 28 Honduras’ elected President Manuel Zelaya was roused from his bed by the military and (apparently while still wearing his pajamas) put on a plane to Costa Rica. Speaking from San Jose the same day Zelaya declared that he had been kidnapped in an illegal coup. In the meantime the Honduran Congress—citing a dubious resignation letter—voted to accept Zelaya’s ‘resignation’ and replace him with the next person in the line of presidential succession, the president of Congress Roberto Micheletti (the Honduran vice-president had earlier vacated his office in order to contest the presidential elections scheduled for later this year).

The Origins of the Crisis in Honduras

The crisis was largely the result of President Zelaya’s own political machinations. Zelaya had proposed to hold a non-binding referendum on Sunday June 28 on whether or not Hondurans supported the idea of redrawing the constitution, a maneuver widely interpreted as a Chavez-inspired bid by Zelaya to do away with the constitution’s unambiguous ban on presidential re-election. The Supreme Court (and, in turn, the attorney general and Congress) had declared the referendum to be illegal since certain clauses of the constitution are considered inviolable and because ultimate authority for revising the constitution rests with Congress. In spite of strenuous opposition Zelaya stubbornly insisted on holding the poll and sought the military’s cooperation in distributing the ballots. When General Romeo Vásquez, head of the armed forces, refused to cooperate he was sacked by the President (only to be questionably ‘reinstated’ by an immediate ruling of the Supreme Court). The following day (Friday, June 26), the defiant president and his supporters seized the ballots from a local air force base and vowed to continue with the referendum. The Court and attorney general then instructed General Vásquez to capture Zelaya and recover the ballots.

Issues of Constitutionality or When is a Coup a Coup?

In this crisis both sides have acted irresponsibly. Zelaya committed the first sin by failing to respect the rulings of the Supreme Court. He also placed his own political ambitions above a constitution that has done well to preserve stability in a fragile democracy. However even if Zelaya’s actions merited his removal from office they did not justify a military action replete with arbitrary detentions, fake documents, a media crackdown, and new restrictions on rights of assembly. If Zelaya is guilty of treason (as the Court alleges) then he should be tried and removed from office legally not overthrown by force.  In the words of Eduardo Enrique Reina, Zelaya’s minister of communication, “The legal mechanism they used to get rid of Zelaya was a machine gun.”

Still, the coup architects maintain that they did act constitutionally, a view that has been echoed in the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal and by Republican lawmakers (including Florida Representatives Connie Mack, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and former Senator Mel Martinez) — not to mention Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, and Charles Krauthammer. A report by the Law Library of Congress furthermore found that critical aspects of Zelaya’s removal were by all appearances constitutional, however the report has generated considerable controversy. Moreover, even the top Honduran military lawyer, Col. Herberth Bayardo Inestroza, acknowledges that they broke the law, as does Deputy Attorney General Roy David Urtecho. Furthermore, Article 71 of the Honduran Constitution specifies that, “No person may be detained or imprisoned for more than twenty-four hours without appearing before a competent authority for trial.”

Imagine, if you will, that an American president is found to be overstepping constitutional boundaries by, say, conducting warrantless surveillance of US citizens. The justice system declares his actions illegal. But the president, citing national security concerns, defies their rulings. Days later, American special forces storm the White House, seize the unpopular president and fly him to Panama. What would you call that? Many American presidents have acted unconstitutionally. However, none have suffered the humiliation of being kidnapped at gunpoint.

My take: By acting with haste and recklessness Zelaya’s detractors ceded the moral high ground before exhausting all of the means at their disposal including international mediation. In so doing they repeated the mistakes of those who acted unlawfully to overthrow Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in April 2002—only to see Chávez returned to power two days later stronger and more defiant than ever.

The Reaction of the International Community

The coup in Honduras was widely condemned by the international community including the United Nations (where Zelaya spoke on June 30th), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the European Union (which suspended some $92 million in aid), and the United States (which suspended aid, revoked the visas of four Honduran officials and halted military cooperation with Honduras). President Obama stated bluntly that, “the coup was not legal and that President Zelaya remains the president of Honduras.” From Moscow, he later declared that, “America supports now the restoration of the democratically elected president of Honduras, even though he has strongly opposed American policies…because we respect the universal principle that people should choose their own leaders, whether they are leaders we agree with or not.”

The Organization of American States. In 1991 the countries of the hemisphere formed a compact to defend and promote democracy that was later formalized in the Inter-American Democratic Charter or IADC of 2001. The OAS’s Democratic Charter has provided a foundation for reacting to the ongoing political developments in Honduras. Responding to a request for mediation from the Honduran government two days prior to the coup, the OAS Permanent Council first issued a resolution on the situation in Honduras [see CP/RES. 952 (1699/09) of June 26, 2009] citing Article 17 of the IADC. On the day of the coup, the Permanent Council met (see video here) and issued a strongly worded resolution [see CP/RES. 953 (1700/09)] and called for a special session of the OAS General Assembly to take place at the headquarters of the Organization beginning Tuesday, June 30, 2009. The Foreign Ministers then issued a 3-day ultimatum to the government [see AG/RES. 1 (XXXVII-E/09) of July 1] to restore Zelaya or face suspension. The OAS Secretary General, Jose Miguel Insulza, subsequently traveled to Honduras to try to broker a negotiated settlement. However, when the Honduran government refused to comply, the OAS issued a second resolution [see AG/RES. 2 (XXXVII-E/09) of July 4] unanimously suspending the government consistent with Articles 20 and 21 of the Democratic Charter.

The OAS has, in turn, become a political target. Conservative commentators such as Glenn Garvin, Mary Anastasia O’Grady and Alvaro Vargas Llosa maintain that the OAS applies a double standard in its defense of democracy, rushing to the defense of besieged left-wing presidents while ignoring the threats to democracy posed by illiberal populists  (viz., Chavez, Morales, Correa, Ortega, and Zelaya) when they are in power.  In an interview with Andres Oppenheimer, Antonio Ledezma — the effectively deposed opposition mayor of Caracas, Venezuela — complained that the OAS is degenerating into “a mutual protection club for power-hungry presidents.” The OAS Secretary General, José Miguel Insulza, responded to these objections noting that “the OAS answers to its member states” and that Honduras’ expulsion adheres to the principles, practices and purposes of the organization.

Obama and the Partisan Split in the United States

As the crisis dragged on, a clear partisan split emerged in the United States with several Republican members of Congress strongly opposing Zelaya’s reinstatement. Senator Jim DeMint (R-S.C.), in a rather irresponsible move, promised to hold up several confirmation hearings in protest of the Obama administration’s handling of the crisis (only in November did DeMint finally relent). On the other side of the aisle, several Democrats and NGOs urged Congress and the Obama administration to more aggressively condemn the coup and enact tougher sanctions, though President Obama maintained that he “can’t push a button and suddenly reinstate Mr. Zelaya.”

The U.S. State Department, in what some regarded as a softening of the U.S.’s initial position, responded to conservatives’ concerns in a letter addressed to Indiana Senator Richard Lugar, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The letter suggested that the United States was unlikely to impose sanctions on Honduras in the event that Zelaya is not reinstated–a position welcomed by conservatives but bitterly opposed by many on the left. Massachusetts Democrat John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed concern that the State Department letter “risks sending a confusing signal” about the United States’ position. Kerry laid the blame for the crisis on Micheletti’s “uncompromising power-grab” and later sparred with DeMint over the senator’s fact-finding mission in Honduras. The State Department for its part has equivocated on whether or not Zelaya’s removal officially meets the legal definition of a military coup d’etat.

My take: Promoting democracy abroad is an admirable goal that serves vital US interests. The United States and the international community should remain steadfast in their opposition to Zelaya’s illegal ouster and not extend recognition to the Micheletti government. If the de facto government remains defiant and ongoing mediation fails, the United States and other members of the Organization of American States (OAS) should consider additional sanctions against Honduras. By the same token, the OAS should prevail upon Zelaya to respect the checks and balances that come with democracy. In short, the international community should continue to push for a negotiated settlement. The alternative is economic and political isolation for Honduras.

Negotiations and Border Crossings (July-August)

A week after the coup, Zelaya vowed to return to Honduras in spite of warnings that he would immediately be arrested on multiple charges if he did so. However, on Sunday July 5th–a day after Honduras’ suspension from the OAS–military vehicles blocked the runways and prevented Zelaya’s plane from landing. In violent clashes near the airport, a teenager was killed. After stops in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Zelaya next traveled to Washington where he met with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. A new American-led initiative to have Costa Rican President Oscar Arias mediate the political crisis was announced. In spite of Arias’ efforts, however, joint negotiations (begun on July 9th in Costa Rica and postponed on July 23rd) produced few signs of compromise. Zelaya then tried to galvanize his supporters by staging a short-lived border crossing into Honduras from Nicaragua on July 24th, a move Hillary Clinton described as “reckless.”

The OAS subsequently organized a special envoy to pressure the interim government into accepting Arias’ compromise plan. After some delay the de facto government agreed to receive the OAS envoy, only to reverse their position before eventually letting the high-level delegation into the country. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also visited the country from August 17-21 to observe the human rights situation in the country; the commission’s preliminary report on Honduras’ human rights situation was highly critical.

Is there still room for compromise? (Part One) Perhaps. Zelaya’s term is nearly finished (it ends Jan. 27th) and he has agreed not to seek re-election under any circumstances. The United States, the OAS, and the Honduran military all back a negotiated settlement, and the Honduran Congress agreed to study the multi-point plan proposed by Arias.  The so-called San Jose Accord calls for the reinstatement of Zelaya, an amnesty for actors on both sides and early elections (elections were scheduled and ultimately held on Nov. 29th).

However, the Micheletti government remained firmly opposed to Zelaya’s reinstatement and the Supreme Court indicated that Zelaya would face trial if he returned to the country. In a counter-proposal, Micheletti offered to resign his post as long as Zelaya did the same. The OAS, however, contends that any negotiated settlement must restore Zelaya to the presidency. Zelaya, in turn, headed to the United States to press his case that the Obama administration should take a tougher stand against the coup. The United States subsequently announced that it was permanently suspending non-humanitarian aid to Honduras, including U.S. Millennium Challenge Account funds worth as much as $200 million.

Can Honduras Vote Itself Out of a Coup? The U.S. furthermore threatened not to recognize the outcome of Honduras’ presidential elections (see my blogpost: Honduras Votes) unless a political settlement is first reached–a position shared by Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and most other Latin American countries (with the notable exception of Panama)–but opposed by those that see the elections as a viable solution to the crisis (including, among others, Micheletti himself and former Secretary of State James A. Baker III). The de facto government announced that the elections would be held as scheduled. Yet others have expressed the opinion that, “If Micheletti thinks that Honduras will overcome its crisis by holding elections under the current circumstances, he’s dreaming. The winner of the elections will remain an international pariah, and Honduras will become increasingly poorer.”

Surprise! The Return of Zelaya (September)

Zelaya again made headlines on Monday, September 21st, when it was announced that the deposed president had secretly returned to Honduras. It was soon confirmed that Zelaya was being housed in the Brazilian embassy in the Honduran capital Tegucigalpa where he addressed his supporters and called for dialogue. The de facto government responded by issuing a curfew, forcefully removing protestors from the streets, cutting off utilities to the embassy, and demanding that Brazil surrender the deposed leader (the Honduran de facto government later took their case against Brazil to the World Court).

Enter Brazil. The Brazilian President Lula da Silva explained that letting Zelaya into its embassy was “what any democratic country would do, ” adding sharply that, “We can’t accept that for political differences people think they have the right to depose a democratically-elected president …  If you like or don’t like something you change it in an election. What you can not do is accept a coup leader who thinks he has the right to be president.” The Brazilian government furthermore warned that it would not tolerate any actions taken against its embassy and personnel (the OAS and UN Security Council later joined Brazil in its condemnation of actions taken against the embassy, which included reports of a toxic gas attack). Lula, speaking at the United Nations called for Zelaya’s reinstatement, noting that, “Unless there is political will, we will see more coups like the one that toppled the constitutional president of Honduras.” Analysts (and many Brazilians) are divided over Brazil‘s seemingly risky role in the crisis.

In the meantime, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Costa Rican President Oscar Arias urged calm while expressing hope that fresh negotiations could help end the crisis. At the same time, though, the U.S. ambassador to the OAS (and a hard-line foreign service officer) Lewis Anselem, criticized Zelaya for his “irresponsible and foolish” return from exile before a settlement was reached.

Is there still room for compromise? (Part Two) In a major development, Micheletti announced that he was willing to talk with Zelaya “as long as he explicitly recognises the presidential elections.” The de facto government then indicated that it would welcome a new OAS mission to the country (a move endorsed by the United States)–only to later expel the OAS representatives from the country and then re-invite them. On September 27th, in a divisive and ultimately counter-productive move, Micheletti issued a 45-day suspension of basic civil liberties (later revoked). The move exposed emerging divisions within Micheletti’s support base, with  some business and military leaders expressing a willingness to allow Zelaya’s return to power. The move also heightened accusations of abuse by Honduran security forces.

A Negotiated End to the Crisis? (October-November)

Negotiations in late September and October neared a major breakthrough when negotiators for both sides appeared to agree on every major point of the San Jose accord–except the return of Zelaya to the presidency.

The United States to the Rescue? As negotiations reached an impasse, the United States stepped up its pressure by sending a high-level envoy to Honduras made up of Tom Shannon (then U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs), Craig Kelly, and Dan Restrepo. At last a power-sharing dealdubbed the Guaymuras Accord (or Tegucigalpa/San Jose Accord)– was reached to form a national unity government, create a truth commission to investigate Zelaya’s ouster, and hold new presidential elections as scheduled. As part of the pact, the decision of whether or not to reinstate Zelaya was left to the Honduran Congress. Unlike the San Jose accord, the pact does not include an amnesty. However ambiguities in the accord left many to conclude that “the political waters are in many ways murkier than they have been since Zelaya was toppled on June 28.”

Although the accord did not explicitly guarantee his immediate return to power, Zelaya indicated that he would consider the deal broken if he wasn’t quickly reinstated. Yet with the election imminent the Honduran Congress appeared to be in no hurry to decide Zelaya’s fate (the decision was eventually slated for Dec. 2nd, a few days after the election). It announced it would first weigh the opinions of Honduras’ Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Human Rights ombudsman. Moreover, it remained unclear how the international community would react if the Honduran Congress decided not to reinstate Zelaya. In an interview with CNN en Español that startled many, Tom Shannon indicated that the United States would be willing to recognize the results of Honduras’ upcoming election–with or without Zelaya–as long as the accord was upheld. Yet this position put the United States at odds with most the region’s leaders (e.g., the OAS and Rio Group) and provoked a strong rebuke from Zelaya.

Totally Dead? After a week  of inaction by Congress, Zelaya declared the accord “totally dead.” Still the United States held out hope that negotiations could be revived and (re)dispatched Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Craig Kelly to Tegucigalpa–even as Zelaya’s supporters were calling for an election boycott. However, Kelly failed to make any progress during his two-day visit. Moreover, Zelaya subsequently indicated he would not accept the outcome of the country’s upcoming elections nor return to the presidency after they take place.

Who’s to blame for the breakdown? Lanny Davis, a well-connected attorney representing the Honduran Business Council, places the blame squarely on Zelaya. The left-leaning Council on Hemispheric Affairs and the Los Angeles Times, on the other hand, blamed Micheletti and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. No doubt both sides of the conflict share the blame for the breakdown.

Will the international community recognize the upcoming election if Zelaya is not reinstated? A strong case can be made for not recognizing Honduras’ upcoming elections. As Christopher Sabatini and Daniel Altschuler recently argued, “U.S. acceptance of the elections results would have revealed a troubling willingness to allow elected leaders to be removed as long as reasonably fair elections follow” and “would have signaled to would-be coup plotters in the region that election years offer opportune moments to overthrow democratically-elected presidents.” Still, in a recent New York Times article, analyst Shelley McConnell noted that if Mr. Zelaya is not returned, the “pragmatic middle ground” may be to work with the O.A.S. to recognize the elections “under protest of how they came about.” For more on the presidential election and Zelaya’s future, see my blogpost: Honduras Votes.

Broader Trends and Implications

The Honduran crisis is emblematic of Latin America’s wider problems with democracy, including weak political institutions, weak rule of law, hyper-presidentialism or caudillismo, the perils of illiberal populism and social-political polarization, politicized term limits, the influence of big business, and the ongoing power of Latin America’s militaries (see related blogpost). The coup has also  had regional reverberations most notably in Nicaragua.

It also shows the limits of the international community, and specifically the OAS, to take preventative action that would curb executive abuses of power that undermine democracy and often lead to political crises such as this (recent developments in Nicaragua provide another example–see blogpost). Indeed, the conflict in Honduran has exposed both the importance and the flaws of the  Inter-American Democratic Charter.

Similarly, the crisis has demonstrated the limitations of the OAS when it comes to taking action against a country which has openly defied its mandates. Throughout the crisis, pressure from the United States appears to have been more decisive than pressure from the OAS or other international actors–with the possible exception of Brazil.

Finally, it confirms that traditional military coups are becoming a thing of the past, but quasi-constitutional coups–in which the head of state is removed by force (or the threat of force) and is replaced by the constitutional successor to power–have emerged as a new and ongoing threat.  Others are calling it a ‘soft coup‘ or, my favorite so far, ‘impeachment on steroids‘. Read the rest of this entry »