Source: Arnulfo Franco / AP

The Bolivarian Blueprint

I use the term “Bolivarian Populism” to denote a particular process of political change exemplified by Venezuela under President Hugo Chavez and imitated to different degrees by other left-leaning Latin American presidents, especially Evo Morales (Bolivia) and Rafael Correa (Ecuador) as well as Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua) and Manuel Zelaya (Honduras). This process of political change typically begins, first, with the election of a political outsider who rails against the traditional political party establishment. Once elected into power, the president next calls for the creation of a constituent assembly to re-write the country’s constitution, a process inevitably marked by substantial partisan conflict (particularly between the president and the legislative and judicial branches of government), increased social polarization, and often a serious breakdown in the rule of law. The new constitutions, approved in more or less democratic plebiscites (or, in Nicaragua’s case, modified by dubious procedures), typically enhance the executive’s power by reducing checks and balances and abolishing presidential term limits. Once the new constitution is in place, finally, the president holds new elections to refresh their mandate. This pattern is particularly evident in Venezuela under Chavez (elected 1998, new constitution 1999, new mandates 2000, 2006 and possibly 2012), Bolivia under Morales (elected 2005, constituent assembly 2006-2007, new constitution and mandate 2009, and possible future mandate in 2014) and Ecuador under Correa (elected 2006, constituent assembly 2007, new constitution 2008, new mandate in 2009 and possibly 2013).

The Decline of Freedom

Chavez and other followers of “Bolivarian Populism” frequently claim that radical changes in political structure are required to make their countries more democratic. Yet recent data from Freedom House (an NGO specializing in measuring freedom around the world) suggests that the results of such changes are typically just the opposite. As the chart below indicates, aggregate measures of political rights and civil liberties have dropped (in some cases precipitously) during the tenure of all five of the leaders most closely associated with Bolivarian Populism. Although the Freedom House data is not a perfect measure of democracy (it is, more precisely, a measure of freedom), the gradual decline in political and civil rights in these countries is unambiguous. The decline has arguably been most striking in Venezuela, a case that has been extensively documented by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

Source: author's computations based on Freedom House data published in 2011.

The Rise of Corruption 

In addition to championing democracy, the Bolivarian Populists often rail against the endemic corruption of their societies and advocate radical political changes as a key part of the solution. Yet recent evidence from Transparency International (an NGO specializing in measuring perceptions of corruption around the world) suggests that the results of such efforts have been disappointing. In the most recent 2010 survey, for example, Venezuela was found to be the most corrupt country in all of Latin America, followed by Paraguay, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Bolivia. The results, as Andres Oppenheimer has argued, are not all that surprising. Indeed, as Transparency International’s Alejandro Salas has noted, “In countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, government leaders have shattered the system of checks and balances. And when there are no watchdogs, you tend to have more arbitrary allocations of funds, and fewer transparent bids for government contracts” (quoted by Oppenheimer).

Conclusion

Although the evidence I have presented here is far from definitive, and the standards by which we should measure the success or failure of the “Bolivarian Revolution” are hotly disputed (a more complete analysis would need, minimally, to include a wide variety of socioeconomic data), recent data support the claim that Chavez’s style of Bolivarian Populism has consistently undermined democratic governance in Latin America.

Both candidates are indeed controversial. On the one hand, in his 2006 bid for the president, Ollanta Humala embraced Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and continues to advocate a Chavez-style constitutional overhaul, media controls, and the redistribution of mineral wealth in Peru. Furthermore, Ollanta has been accused of serious human rights crimes, including murder, sedition and torture; his younger brother, Antauro, was sentenced to jail for leading a violent revolt against the government in 2005.  On the other hand, Keiko Fujimori draws a large base of her support from the followers of her father and former dictator Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) who is currently serving a 25-year sentence for various abuses of power including ordering assassinations and kidnappings. Keiko maintains that her father is innocent of such charges. A few years ago, she pledged to pardon her father if she was elected (more recently she has backed away from this pledge, just as Humala has tried to distance himself from the more extreme views of his family members).

The Peruvian Paradox 

Considering Peru’s recent economic success and relative political stability, the country’s sudden political polarization is something of a paradox. How do we explain the collapse of the moderate political center in Peru? At least three explanations merit consideration. First, in what former U.S. ambassador Dennis Jett describes as “Peru’s political suicide“, the centrist vote was split between three relatively strong candidates in the first round of voting, including economist Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, former President Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) and former Lima Mayor Luis Castaneda. Although they collectively captured 44 percent of the vote, they trailed Humala (31%) and Fujimori (23%) individually. Still, this explanation cannot account for the widespread appeal of Humala and Fujimori who garnered more than half of the first round vote. A second explanation, in turn, suggests that the benefits of Peru’s economic success have not been widely shared, causing the poor and disenfranchised to vote for more extreme options. A defeated Alejandro Toledo remarked, for instance, that voters, “expressed their rage … at having economic growth without the distribution of the benefits of that growth” (he made the same point five years ago). A third explanation suggests that it is the weakness of the Peruvian political system more generally that is to blame. For example, the collapse of Peru’s traditional political parties has enabled political outsiders such as Humala to gain increasing political clout. Similarly the failure of the political center to unite behind a single candidate suggests that politics in Peru continues to be personality-driven, with ex-presidents and their kin exerting a notable influence.

Peru 2011-2016: What Kind of Presidency?

Although both candidates have increasingly campaigned toward the center, many remain worried that Peru could be headed toward a more authoritarian and populist future, be it left-wing and nationalist (Humala) or right-wing and security-oriented (Fujimori).

Humala, for his part, has tried to distance himself from his previous association with Hugo Chavez and instead pointed to the Brazilian experience which, he noted, “has combined economic growth with social inclusion.” At the level of foreign policy, Humala has also expressed his desire to strengthen relations with the United States rather than the Venezuelan-led regional bloc ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas). Still, because of his past associations with Chavez and his status as an inexperienced political outsider, an Humala presidency would likely encounter stiff resistance from the business community, the news media and the traditional political establishment in Peru.

Keiko, for her part, has made fighting crime one of her key electoral pledges. T0 underscore the tough approach she would take on criminals (“mano dura”), she hired former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani as a campaign consultant and had him join her on the campaign trail. If elected Keiko would enter office with at least some political experience (she was elected to Congress in 2006) yet would have trouble overcoming the shadow of her father.

Pre-election polls suggested that the two candidates were in a virtual tie.

Postscript: Victory for Humala

According to official returns, Humala won the election with 51.5% of the vote. Why did he win and what are the implications of his victory for the future of Peru? According to available data, Humala won with strong support from southern and eastern Peru, especially the rural interior — areas that have not benefited from Peru’s economic boom as much as the country’s urban coast. (He was also the preferred candidate among men and those over forty). Humala also succeeded in convincing many voters in the political center, including former presidential candidate Alejandro Toledo, that he would (broadly speaking) maintain free market policies and respect the democratic rules of the game.

Although the Peruvian stock market initially sank over fears that Humala’s victory could lead to radical changes in the country, seasoned observers are predicting that Humala will follow a more moderate and pragmatic course of action. Michael Shifter, for one, notes that Humala’s narrow victory represents “a mandate for moderate change” and “better distribution of the fruits of development,” but not a Venezuelan-style makeover. In a similar vein, Andres Oppenheimer, argues that Humala faces a number of constraints, especially an opposition-controlled Congress, that make radical changes unlikely–at least in the near term. Still others, such as the Christian Science Monitor’s Sara Miller Llana, see Humala’s victory as signaling the demise of the hard-core left in Latin America and its replacement with a new consensus model favoring growth with equity.

My take: I agree that there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic that President Humala will eschew the failed policies of the hard-core left in Latin America. As I noted in an interview with Florida’s El Sentinel, Humala (and Peru) has little to gain from a strong alliance with Venezuela President Hugo Chavez–and much to lose.

The Haitian and Peruvian elections shared a common feature: in both, the first round eliminated the presumed front-runner(s) and the second round pitted political outsiders (singer Michel Martelly and x-lieutenant colonel Ollanta Humala) against former first ladies (Mirlande Manigat and Keiko Fujimori). In both cases, the political outsiders carried the day. Guatemala’s election in September likewise featured an x-military honcho, General Otto Perez Molina, though (recently divorced) former first lady, Sandra Torres was deemed ineligible to run. In Argentina, another former first lady, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner easily claimed victory.

Haiti. The Haitian election has been decided: singer Michel “Sweet Micky” Martelly won the controversial presidential runoff election in a landslide, earning 68 percent of the vote.

Peru. The winner of Peru’s divisive presidential runoff is Ollanta Humala. (For a deeper analysis, see my blogpost: “Polarization in Peru: The 2011 Presidential Elections“).

Mexico’s Drug War: A Problem “Made in the USA”

Mexico has become the main focal point in the regional war on drugs. There are many reasons for this, but the most obvious is the fact that Mexico occupies a strategic geographic position bordering the United States, the world’s largest and most lucrative drug market (one is reminded of Porfirio Diaz’s famous quote: “Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States!”).

American consumers of illegal drugs create massive demand. Marijuana, for example, commands an annual market worth an estimated $113 billion in the U.S. (our largest cash crop!) and is the most significant source of profit for the Mexican drug mafias (an estimated 60% of the cartels’ profits are derived from the marijuana market compared to 28% for cocaine and 1% for meth).

Mexico is the key supplier of illegal drugs to consumers in the United States. It is the largest foreign source of marijuana for the U.S. market, producing an estimated output of 35 million pounds in 2008! Furthermore, some 200 tons of crystal meth enters the U.S. from Mexico each year (after a U.S. law regulating over-the-counter sales of pseudoephedrine curbed domestic meth production, the Mexican cartels rushed to fill the void). And although cocaine originates in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, 90% of the coke entering the U.S. comes through Mexico.

Guns Without Borders (or How the NRA is Helping to Arm Mexico’s Drug Lords). The drugs flow north and huge profits from the illegal drug trade flow south (an estimated $25 to $40 billion in drug money flows to Mexico annually). And so do the guns. It’s estimated that 90% of the guns in the hands of the country’s drug mafias are purchased in the United States in the thousands of gun stores that line the border. How? Read this fascinating article and learn about four men who bought and smuggled 101 guns from 10 licensed dealers in Houston from June 2006 to June 2007. In addition to seeking help with arms interdiction, Mexican officials have appealed to the U.S. Congress to reinstate a ban on the sale of assault weapons that expired in 2004 but to no avail.

Cartel Geography

Much of the ongoing violence in the country can be understood in terms of rivalries over the country’s strategic drug entry and exit points (as well as the government’s concerted effort to shut them down). Cocaine arrives to Mexico in three strategic locations: over land via Guatemala (20%), by sea along the Gulf of Mexico (30%), and via the Pacific Ocean (50%) where it arrives to coastal states such as Guerrero (home to sunny Acapulco), Michoacan, and Sinaloa. (It’s no accident that the country’s largest drug mafias, the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels, are so named). Cocaine (along with plenty of Mexican-grown pot, meth, and some heroin) then exits the country across key Mexico-U.S. border cities in California, New Mexico and Texas including Tijuana/San Diego, Juarez/El Paso, and Nuevo Laredo/Laredo.

Mexico’s various drug mafias (Tijuana, Juarez, Gulf, Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Beltrán-Leyva, and La Familia) appear to be largely interchangeable, though a few have some distinguishing characteristics. Certainly their leaders all have good nicknames.

The Sinaloa cartel, led by Mexico’s most-wanted criminal, Joaquín El Chapo (“Shorty”) Guzmán, is described by the Economist as “smarter and more sophisticated” than its competition; it has largely eluded the Mexican government’s three-year crackdown (conspiracies abound).

The Beltrán-Leyva Group (once aligned to Sinaloa) survives in spite of the fact that its notorious leader, Arturo Beltrán Leyva (AKA “The Beard”), was killed in Cuernavaca during a shootout with Mexican Marines in late 2009.

La Familia: Dealing Drugs for Jesus

By far the strangest of Mexico’s drug mafias is the Narco-Evangelist “Masters of Meth” known as “The Family.” Led by Nazario Moreno (AKA El Más Loco, or “The Craziest One”), La Familia hails from the Pacific coast state of Michoacán. While they are infamous for committing savage acts of violence (they once tossed five decapitated heads onto a dance floor in the city of Uruapan and are blamed for a grenade attack on innocent civilians in the state capital, Morelia), internally they adhere to a quasi-Christian code of ethics including abstention from drugs, support for the poor, and traditional family values.

In what the Wall Street Journal describes as a “vertically integrated” industry, La Familia’s presence extends deep into the United States where they control retail networks across the country. Recently, in a major counter-narcotics sweep, La Familia members were arrested in 38 U.S. cities including Atlanta and Chicago.

Sex, Drugs and Narcocorrido

Mexican cartels behave essentially like other international drug mafias, employing a mixture of brutality, corruption and a certain amount of business savvy. Much of the cartels’ violence is directed at one another (and, to a lesser extent, the Mexican military and police) as rival drug gangs compete for control of strategic trafficking arteries. Violence is also used to commit other crimes, especially extortion and kidnapping, both of which are targeted at Mexico’s business community (it’s estimated that the violence in Mexico saps 3% of the country’s GDP annually).

Corruption is also an integral aspect of the cartels’ operations. With the vast profits of the drug trade at their disposal, Mexico’s drug mafias are adept at buying off all likes of government officials. The story of Luis F. Alarid, an American Iraqi war veteran and U.S. customs inspector, is highly instructive. While most customs inspectors can expect to earn about $70,000 a year, Alarid pocketed $200,000 in a few months by waving in vehicles that should have raised suspicion. In Mexico, police officers and members of the justice system can often be bought for much less. Time Magazine describes how La Familia paid off a variety of public servants in Michoacán with payments of $20,000 a month, wild parties, and “truck loads of prostitutes.”

Of course, the cartels are also master smugglers. When outright bribery fails, traffickers have been able to evade border security by building sophisticated drug tunnels under the Mexico-U.S. border. They can also try sneaking it through in a van:

Fighting the Drug War: Five Alternatives

#1: Militarization (Status Quo). Mexico’s current (U.S.-backed) approach to the war on drugs can best be described as militarization. In light of the weaknesses of Mexico’s local and state police, President Felipe Calderon has relied heavily on the military in his war against drug smuggling–some 5o,000 troops have been dispatched to drug hot spots across Mexico. The premise of the militarization strategy is fairly straightforward: establish the rule of law by destroying the drug cartels. Although the Mexican military has had some successes with this approach (taking out Arturo Beltrán Leyva for one), critics question whether or not the drug war can really be won on the supply side alone as long as the demand for drugs remains high. As Andres Oppenheimer remarked, “Drug cartels don’t die; they just move.” Or in the words of one drug kingpin, Ismael Zambada, “As for the bosses, locked up, dead or extradited, their replacements are already standing by.” The militarization approach also entails fairly high costs in terms of lives lost and raw expenditure (as well as political risks for Mexico’s well respected military).

#2: Institutionalization (Status Quo Revised). The status quo may be shifting somewhat. Mexico and the United States recently unveiled a new security cooperation agreement that places greater emphasis on institution-building and community development. Still, some analysts are skeptical that Mexico’s U.S.-backed militarization strategy will change much.

#3: Strategic Truce (Status Quo Ante?). An alternative approach and what many regard as the status quo ante in Mexico (particularly under the PRI) would be to mitigate the violence of the drug trade by reaching a strategic truce with the cartels-essentially turning a blind eye to the drug trade in exchange for peace. Although such an approach appears tantamount to surrender, former Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda points out that, “This is less scandalous than it may appear. It would be similar to the approach the Obama administration is taking with poppy growers and heroin producers in Afghanistan.” Castaneda also made this point in a recent interview on CNN’s Amanpour.

#4: Decriminalization. Surprisingly, a number of Latin American countries (including Argentina, Colombia and Mexico) have recently decriminalized the possession  (though not the production and distribution) of small amounts of drugs. This is a fairly modest and common sense policy designed to keep the police chasing  hardened criminals rather than extorting petty drug users. However, it is difficult to see how decriminalization would alter the broader dynamics of Mexico’s Drug War in any significant way.

#5: Legalization. You don’t have to be a Harvard economist to understand the rationalization for drug legalization, though maybe it helps. In a lucid editorial for CNN, Jeffrey Miron, an economist and author of Drug War Crimes, explains how the violence and corruption associated with Mexico’s drug trade is a direct result of prohibition (specifically, drug prohibition in the United States). As he summarizes, “Violence results from policies that create black markets, not from the characteristics of the good or activity in question.” The case for the legalization of marijuana, arguably the least harmful illegal drug and the main source of revenue for the Mexican cartels (ironic considering how easy it is to produce), is perhaps the most compelling of all. Legalization could also, calculates professor Miron, save us $77 billion (and stop the redistribution of income to criminals):

To be sure, the United States is the critical actor in the legalization debate. Legalizing drugs in Mexico alone would not end the powerful incentives the violent drug cartels have to smuggle drugs into the United States, their primary market. Although U.S. policy-makers are loathe to contemplate drug legalization, even a modest policy shift like the legalization of medical marijuana (already a reality in fourteen states) could dramatically alter the marijuana marketplace and usefully undercut Mexico’s violent drug cartels. As a Washington Post article neatly summarizes, “competition from thousands of mom-and-pop marijuana farmers in the United States threatens the bottom line for powerful Mexican drug organizations in a way that decades of arrests and seizures have not.” Maybe President Obama, who pledged the federal government would not arrest medical marijuana users and suppliers who follow state laws, deserves that Peace Prize after all.

How Violent is Latin America?

The answer is: rather extremely violent and dangerous. However, it also depends. Latin America is a diverse region. Some countries and cities are extremely violent and others are perfectly safe. For example, an analysis of one commonly used measure of violence — the homicide rate per 100,000 people — reveals dramatic variations from country to country.*

Canada (1.6) has the lowest homicide rate in the hemisphere, comparable to Western Europe (1.4). Peru (3.8) is not far behind. Several other countries – Argentina (5.7), Chile (8.5), Costa Rica (7.6), Cuba (6.2) and Uruguay (5.5) – have homicide rates that are comparable to that of the United States (5.6).

Mexico (11), Panama (11.6), Nicaragua (13.2), Bolivia (14.9), Paraguay (16), Ecuador (17.9) and the Dominican Republic (18.1) – are notably more violent than the United States but still more pacific than, say, Russia (19.9).

A final set of countries exhibit fairly extreme levels of violence – Haiti (21.6), Brazil (26.6), Guatemala (36.4), Honduras (39.2), Venezuela (40), Colombia (50.4), and Jamaica (51.6). El Salvador (59) has one of the highest reported homicide rates in the world, edging out South Africa (47.5) and Lesotho (50.7).

*Data sources: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Homicide Statistics (the rates reported here are the country averages for all sources for the years 2003-2008). The data for Russia, South Africa and Lesotho are from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2007/2008 (2007), Table 27. The map is from UNODC (2004).

The Surprisingly Safety of (parts of) Mexico

The nature and scope of violent crime in Mexico is certainly shocking. As Bloomberg.com bluntly summarizes, “News reports in Mexico are filled with stories about police turning up dead by the dozen, discoveries of decapitated bodies, and firefights with drug gangs using assault rifles.” Since President Felipe Calderon launched an offensive against drug cartels in December 2006 it is estimated that drug-related violence has claimed as many as 23,000 lives. Ciudad Juarez, a northern border city of approximately 1.5 million people, had more than 2,500 murders in 2009 alone (476 in September). With a horrifying homicide rate of 173 per 100,000, it is one of the deadliest cities in the world.

Nevertheless, the escalating violence in certain parts of Mexico conceals the surprising fact that the country’s homicide rate has actually declined over the past twelve years. As an interactive map by the Los Angeles Times illustrates, drug-war-related deaths are largely concentrated in the Northern border states of Baja California (home to Tijuana) and Chihuahua (home to Ciudad Juarez), the Pacific coast states of Sinaloa, Guerrero and Michoacan and adjacent states such as Durango and Mexico state. Furthermore, the vast majority of the dead are criminals.

Many popular tourist destinations like Cancun and the Yucatan peninsula, Oaxaca, Puerto Vallarta (Nayarit) and Cabo San Lucas (Baja California Sur) are largely untouched, a fact highlighted by an LA Times feature on “Mexico’s family-friendly hot spots” (see also their feature on American exapts (“refugees”) in Mexico, “One man’s war zone is another’s paradise“). Mexico City, often derided for its excessive pollution and crime, has a homicide rate on par with Los Angeles (and less than a third of that for the American capital, Washington, D.C.); pollution levels have also declined to semi-endurable levels. As a recent Miami Herald article summarizes, “The annual murder rate for the estimated 500,000 American citizens in Mexico at any one time has risen – but still remains lower than in some U.S. cities: about 15 per 100,000. Baltimore’s 2009 homicide rate was 37 per 100,000 residents.”

Global Danger Zones: Central and South America

Tragically, the gruesome violence in Mexico pails in comparison to that of much of Central and South America. As the UN map above makes clear, the level of violence in these regions is rivaled only by that of the southernmost countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Trends are particularly worrying in Central America, where the countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have increasingly been ravaged by violent gangs (maras) and organized crime. The tiny country of El Salvador (population seven million) registered 4,365 murders in 2009 (up from 3,179 in 2008), a homicide rate exceeding 60 per 100,000. With a population of 7.7 million, Honduras recorded 6,236 murders in 2010 (and more than 20,000 over the last five years), making it perhaps the most violent country in the world. Violence levels are also shockingly high in many parts of South America. In Brazil, some 11,000 people were shot dead by the police since 2003, which is to say nothing of the even greater casualties inflicted by the country’s violent criminals.

The View from Latin America

Latin Americans have long criticized the OAS for being a U.S.-dominated institution and sought mechanisms to counter-balance the influence of the United States in shaping the regional agenda. Over the last decade the search for such mechanisms has only intensified. There are a number of reasons for this new multilateralism in Latin America, including the declining influence (and attention) of the United States in the region; long-standing dissatisfaction with American policies; the  rise of extra-regional trade and investment partners such as the European Union, China and India; and the new spirit of independence among Latin American leaders, particularly those on the left.

Latin America’s vision for an “OAS without Empire” was well captured by Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa in an interview on CNN en Español (see below). While stressing that the goal of the new institution was not to replace the OAS, Correa  emphasized the need for Latin Americans to have their own institutions responding to their own interests. Even Mexico’s conservative President and staunch North American ally Felipe Calderón suggested the new bloc could counter (though not supplant) the OAS. For example, a Latin American forum excluding the United States and Canada would likely issue very different statements on contentious policy issues such as climate change, the Cuban embargo, the Falkland/Malvinas islands conflict, and the U.S.-led war(s) on drugs and terror. Still others, notably Mexico’s polemical former foreign minister Jorge Castañeda, expressed concern that the forum could have undesirable consequences if it alienates the United States from Latin America.

The View from Washington

Latin America’s seeming break from the OAS comes at a time when many in Washington are questioning the utility of the OAS as well.  A U.S. Senate report commissioned by Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was highly critical of the OAS and its Secretary General José Miguel Insulza. In a recent editorial, the Washington Post similarly lashed out at the OAS’s failure to consistently defend democracy in the region, sharply criticized Insulza, and urged Congress to “consider whether the United States should continue to provide the bulk of the funding for the OAS when it fails to live by its own charter.” Liz Harper, a contributing blogger for Americas Quarterly, faulted the OAS on similar grounds and suggested that it undergo a John Bolton-inspired downsizing of its bureaucracy. More sympathetic voices have suggested the need for institutional reforms, such as the creation of a UN-style Security Council or a Commission on Democracy, to make the OAS more effective at responding to regional crises. Striking a more optimistic tone, Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue has been one of the few to suggest that, “Obama would be wise to elevate the importance of the OAS.” Senators John Kerry and Robert Menendez recently introduced legislation to improve the embattled institution.

Conclusion: Does the OAS Have a Future?

Although enthusiasm for the OAS appears to be waning in both Latin America and Washington, the organization is unlikely to be supplanted anytime soon. The reason is three-fold.

First, in spite of recent criticism, the OAS retains distinctive normative and institutional strengths in important issue areas such as the promotion of democracy, election monitoring and human rights. Indeed, although many Latin American leaders have argued that the OAS should have taken a more aggressive approach in protesting the coup in Honduran last year and excluded Honduran President Porfirio Lobo from attending the summit, they showed no such qualms about welcoming the region’s least democratic leader, Cuban President Raúl Castro. The simple fact is that the regional democracy promotion agenda will be substantially weakened without the participation of the United States and Canada.

Second, Latin America’s push for a new “OAS without Empire” confronts obstacles of its own that are just as formidable, if not more so, as those confronting the OAS. For example, the internal divisions that have stymied the OAS were similarly on display in Playa del Carmen when Presidents Chávez and Uribe traded insults over bilateral relations. Moreover, as Andres Oppenheimer points out, Latin American leaders have a fairly limited vision for their new institution. It doesn’t even have a name yet, let alone stable financing or an institutional headquarters.

Third, and most importantly, the OAS can easily co-exist with (and benefit from) other multilateral institutions in the region. Indeed, the United States has thus far welcomed the creation of the new institution. If Latin American leaders can create a forum to solve their own problems, this is all the better for the United States and the agenda-heavy OAS. For instance, it was recently announced that Presidents Calderón, Lula and Leonel Fernández of the Dominican Republic would form a “group of friends” to mediate between Colombia and Venezuela. This initiative should be welcomed regardless of its institutional origin. The OAS could use a little competition.

Further Reading

DePalma, Anthony. “U.S. House of Representatives Goes “Animal House” on the OAS,” Americas Quaterly Blog 20 July 2011.

“How Important is the Organization of American States?“ interview with Harriet Babbitt, Roger Noriega, and John Maisto, Latin America Advisor, August 9, 2011.

Oppenheimer, Andres. “OAS is a basket case – but a needed one,” Miami Herald 25 July 2011.

Richardson, Bill. “U.S. should not retreat from the hemisphere,” Miami Herald 28 July 2011.

Rogin, Josh. “House panel votes to defund the OAS,” Foreign Policy: The Cable 20 July 2011.

“The United States and Latin America: Collateral damage,” Economist 2 Aug. 2011.

Bye Bye Zelaya

Lobo’s first act as president was to sign an amnesty decree issued by the Honduran Congress. The decree absolves Zelaya and the Honduran military for any abuses of power associated with the June 2009 crisis (though Zelaya was not absolved of other charges, including embezzlement). In a deal brokered by President Leonel Fernandez of the Dominican Republic and President Lobo, Zelaya was granted safe passage out of the Brazilian Embassy in Honduras (where he had been holed up for 129 days) to the Dominican Republic. Zelaya vowed to return to Honduras. Six high-ranking members of the Honduran military also faced charges of abuse of power; however, they were found not guilty by the Honduran Supreme Court.

Lone Wolf?

President Lobo’s inaugration was a relatively lonely affair. Many regional leaders continue to shun the Lobo government as a result of the country’s protracted democratic crisis stemming from Zelaya’s ouster on June 28, 2009. Still, such opposition appears to be weakening. The United States, for its part, has embraced the new president but insisted that additional steps need to be taken (e.g., the creation of a Truth Commission to investigate the June 2009 crisis) before Honduras can be returned to good standing in the Organization of American States and other regional institutions. Sanctions against Honduras have taken a heavy toll on the poverty-stricken country; upon taking office, Lobo found the country to be bankrupt. Lobo has moved quickly to establish the Truth Commission; it was announced that the effort will be spearheaded by Guatemalan statesman Eduardo Stein and that the report will be released in four months (after some delay, it is scheduled to be released in May 2011). For his part, Zelaya was not impressed.

My take: It’s time for the international community and the Honduran people to move on and for Honduras to be readmitted into the inter-American community. The recent decision by El Salvador’s left-wing government to recognize Lobo’s conservative government (and hints from others that they will likely do the same), as well as the recent announcement that the World Bank will restore development aid to Honduras, bode well for an end to the political crisis. With the amnesty firmly in place, the Truth Commission will be well positioned to set the record straight as regards the events of June 2009 (though there is skepticism that the inquiry will succeed).

Further reading

Eldridge, Joseph and Vicki Gass, “Restoring International Relations With Honduras: A Way Forward,” Huffington Post, January 26, 2010.

Recent developments

Committee to Protect Journalists, “CPJ alarmed by wave of anti-press attacks in Honduras,” April 6th, 2011.

Economist, “Honduras and its former president: Why a pariah may return,” March 10th, 2011. Might Zelaya soon return to Honduras?

Frank, Dana, “US: Wrong on Honduras,” The Nation, Jan. 31, 2011.

Stevenson, Mark, “Year later, new coup talks,” Miami Herald, June 28, 2010.

Costa Rica (Feb. 7, 2010). The winner of Costa Rica’s presidential election is the ridiculously named but no nonsense former VP Laura Chinchilla (picture below). She defeated rivals Otto Guevara and Otton Solis.

Colombia (May 30 and June 20, 2010): Uribism without Uribe? Manuel Zelaya’s attempts to remold the Honduran constitution appear amateurish when contrasted with President Alvaro Uribe’s drive to (again) amend the constitution and seek a third consecutive term. However, in a surprising development, Colombia’s Constitutional Court rejected Uribe’s bid to hold a constitutional referendum, leaving Colombia’s presidential elections wide open. Former defense minister Juan Manuel Santos, an Uribe ally, quickly emerged as the front-runner – though he faced a challenge from Green Party nominee Antanas Mockus. Santos easily won the run-off on June 20 garnering 69% of the vote. 

Venezuela (Sept. 26, 2010). What’s remaining of Venezuela’s “democracy” was on display during legislative elections in September. Before the election even occurred, Chavez sycophants such as actor Sean Penn and analyst Mark Weisbrot were already upset that the international media would use the occasion to highlight the government’s lack of democratic legitimacy. As Chavez’s support at home continued to dwindle, others worried he would seek to cancel the elections altogether. In the end, Chavez’s party lost the popular vote but maintained a majority of the legislative seats through gerrymandering.

Brazil (Oct. 3 and Oct. 31, 2010). Who will replace Brazil’s beloved Lula? The contenders included Lula’s chief of staff Dilma Rousseff, former Sao Paulo state governor Jose Serra, and environmentalist Sen. Marina Silva. In the first round of voting, Rousseff claimed 47% of the vote, compared to 33% for Serra and 19% for Marina Silva. A run-off election pitting Rousseff and Serra took place on October 31st; Rousseff won 56% of the vote. She was inaugurated as Brazil’s first female president on January 1st, 2011.

Haiti (Nov. 28, 2010). In light of the devastation caused by the 2010 earthquake (what remains of the country’s electoral council headquarters is pictured below), Haiti’s legislative elections (originally scheduled for February 28th) were postponed until November 28th (also the date of the country’s presidential elections). Prior to the earthquake, the legislative elections were already generating controversy after the country’s presidentially-appointed electoral council banned more than a dozen parties (including ousted former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas) from participating. Critics alleged that election officials were stacking the deck in favor of President Preval’s newly created Unity party in a bid to change the constitution and boost executive power.

In 2011, Haitians (March 20),  Peruvians (April 20),Guatemalans (September), Argentines (October 23), and Nicaraguans (November 6) will head to the polls to pick new presidents.

Obama’s Challenge. Obama inherited a dual challenge in Latin America. First, to overcome the negative legacy of President Bush’s divisive War on Terror and rebuild trust in the hemisphere. Second, to come to grips with a rapidly changing global and hemispheric landscape marked by the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, and especially China (the so-called BRIC countries). The regional landscape has also been dramatically transformed by the rise of left-wing governments including anti-American populists such as Hugo Chavez. These forces, along with the devastating financial crisis in the United States, contributed to a growing spirit of independence on the part of Latin America. Proclaimed one sympathetic observer, “Latin America Breaks Free.” Could Obama re-unite the Americas?

Obama the Candidate. During the campaign, Obama outlined his proposal for “A New Partnership for the Americas” which aimed to depart from Bush-era policies in a number of ways. First, at the global level, he would withdraw U.S. military forces from Iraq, close the U.S. detention facility in Guatanamo and engage critics of the United States such as Cuba, Iran and Venezuela with constructive diplomacy. At the regional level, Obama promised to reduce travel and other restrictions to Cuba (though he backed away from lifting the embargo), rationalize immigration policy, increase aid to impoverished countries, battle both the supply and demand side in the war on drugs in Mexico and Colombia, and partner with Brazil to develop green energy. He would also oppose the Colombia Free Trade deal and seek to amend the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Obama’s proposals were received with both hope and skepticism by D.C.-based think tanks such as the Center for International Policy and the Council on Hemipsheric Affairs which saw the prospect of fairly modest changes.

Obama the President. In his first year in office Obama has indeed made modest advances in developing a “New Partnership” in the Americas. But much as the skeptics anticipated Obama has failed to fundamentally repair America’s strained relations with Latin America. To be sure, Obama has helped to improve the image of the United States around the world by placing a greater emphasis on multilateral cooperation and diplomacy. The Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago (where he received a handshake and some reading material from Chavez) was considered “a personal triumph” in terms of Obama’s public relations with Latin America (though the summit itself was largely a failure). And, as Andres Oppenheimer points out, Obama has followed through on a number of his pledges (most notably Cuba) even as Latin America remains (as it was under Bush) a low priority on his foriegn policy agenda.

The honeymoon did not last long. By year’s end, Obama was facing increased resistance from Latin American leaders who expressed  growing opposition to America’s military partnership with Colombia and disappointment with Obama’s handling of the democratic crisis in Honduras–both of which contributed to a minor rift between the U.S. and a critical ally Brazil. Many were also disappointed that Obama did not go further in reducing travel restrictions to Cuba. Time Magazine’s Tim Padgett reflected the attitude of many Latin Americans when he declared in a year-end summary that, “Obama’s Latin American Policy Looks Like Bush’s.”

My take: While disappointing in many respects, Obama’s Latin America Policy reflects the fundamental constraints the president faces in establishing a new partnership in the Americas. On the one hand, Obama’s domestic agenda–economic recovery, healthcare reform–has taken clear precedence in his first year in office while his foreign policy agenda has been dominated by two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. policy toward Latin America furthermore continues to be hampered by powerful domestic interest groups (the Cubans, of course, but also big agriculture) and needlessly obstructive checks and balances (Senator DeMint, I’m looking at you). On the other hand, Obama is largely powerless to combat the growing independence of Latin America which has been fueled by (among other things) impressive economic growth in Brazil, the increased  economic presence of China and Europe in the region, and the enduring appeal of anti-American populism.

That said, there is still room for maneuver–and substantial room for improvement–as Obama moves into his second year. On a positive note, the president begins his second year in office with his foreign policy team fully in place–after months of partisan delay, Arturo Valenzuela was finally confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs in November. Obama’s proposal for a “New Partnership” still serves as a useful guide–immigration reform and improving bilateral relationships with key allies such as Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil should be top priorities in 2010. And, needless to say, the United States should do everything within its means to assist the earthquake-ravaged country of Haiti.

Further Reading

Jorge Castañeda, “Adios, Monroe Doctrine,”  The New Republic, December 28, 2009. See also the  rejoinder by Michael Shifter.

Grandin, Greg, “Muscling Latin America,” The Nation, January 21, 2010.

Peter Hakim, “The Obama Administration: A Difficult Year in Latin America,” El Universal (Mexico), January 7, 2010. A video interview with Peter Hakim is also available here.

Collin Laverty, “Why Latin America is Disappointed with Barack Obama,” Huffington Post, January 7, 2010.

Jim Lobe, “Inertia on US-Latin America Relations,” Havana Times, January 6, 2010.

Christopher Sabatini, “Obama’s Latin American Policy: Talking Like It’s 1999,” Huffington Post, April 7, 2010.

Christopher Sabatini and Jason Marczak, “Obama’s Tango:  Restoring U.S. Leadership in Latin America,” Foreign Affairs: Snapshots, January/February 2010. A video interview with Christopher Sabatini and Shannon O’Neil is also available here.

Michael Shifter, “Obama and Latin America: Year One,” El Colombiano, December 26, 2009.

Julia E. Sweig, “Obama’s Disappointing Year in Latin America,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 12, 2010.

Chile: Human Rights in the Spotlight. As in Uruguay (see below), human rights issues have  come to the fore during the election. On the eve of the first round vote, a Chilean court charged several Pinochet-era officials with the murder of former president (1964-1970) Eduardo Frei Montalva, father of the current candidate of the same name (Piñera’s campaign questioned the timing of the indictment). Piñera is expected to favor reconciliation over prosecution. It remains to be seen if Piñera will uphold Chile’s “post-Pinochet moral legacy.”

Bolivia Votes (Dec. 6, 2009). By virtue of Bolivia’s new constitution (approved in Jan. 2009 after a bitter internal struggle), President Evo Morales became eligible for a second five-year term (he was elected to his first term in 2005).  Morales easily won re-election  with 63% of the vote. Furthermore his party, Movement Toward Socialism, won a strong majority in both houses of Congress.

Uruguay Votes (Oct. 25, 2009; Nov. 29, 2009). The first round of Uruguay’s presidential election featured three main candidates: Pedro Bordaberry of the Colorado Party (and son of a former Uruguayan dictator), former President (1990-1995) Luis Alberto Lacalle of the center-right National Party and ex-Tupamaru guerrilla José “Pepe” Mujica of the ruling and left-leaning Broad Front coalition. In the first round of voting, the mercurial Mr Mujica got about 48 percent of the votes compared to 30 percent for Lacalle.

Mujica wins. The second round of voting took place on Nov. 29. Mujica carried the day with over 50 percent of the vote. He is expected to continue the moderate left policies of current President Tabare Vazquez. He will take office on March 1, 2010.

Uruguay: Human Rights in the Spotlight. The Uruguayan election takes place amid a series of landmark prosecutions for human rights abuses that occurred during the 1973-1985 military regime. Gregorio Alvarez, the last of Uruguay’s dictators, was recently sentenced to 25 years in prison for his participation in the murderous “Operation Condor.” Candidate Pedro Bordaberry’s father, Juan Maria Bordaberry, is currently under house arrest on similar charges (the 81-year old Bordaberry was eventually sentenced to 30 years in prison). Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently ruled that an amnesty law passed in 1986 (and reaffirmed by plebiscite in 1989) is unconstitutional. Voters went to the polls in October to decide if the amnesty should be rescinded, but only 42 percent supported the measure.